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The issue of lone-wolf terrorism is not uniquely a modern one though it is a growing 
concern. Through the transforming utilization of the internet, terror groups have been able to 
recruit around the world, increasing the rate, regularity, and accessibility of radicalization. 
However, identifying, defining, and establishing cohesive cognitive, behavioral and intentional 
profiles of lone-wolf terrorists by way of analysis of historical case studies and review of current 
literature can assist in the prevention and apprehension of potential threats, prior to full 
radicalization. Identifying patterns amongst historical lone-wolf terrorists can establish greater 
reliability with regard to apprehension, prevention, and decreasing radicalization in an 
increasingly digital era.  
This study was conducted via analysis of historical case studies, review of current 
literature, and exploration of current world trends. First, historical case studies of lone-wolf 
terrorism were collected and analyzed to (1) define essential foundational terminology, (2) 
establish profiles of historically significant lone-wolf terrorists and (3) identify and analyze 
cohesive patterns amongst these cognitive and behavioral profiles. In conjunction with analysis 
of historical case studies, a review of current literature served as a basis for exploration of 
transforming global trends of radicalization and the implications and response on law 
enforcement approaches to the apprehension of potential lone-wolf terrorists.  
The results of current literature facilitated modern definitions of radicalization and lone-
wolf terrorism. As technology, political agendas, and religious beliefs transform with the modern 
era, so do the definitions of lone-wolf terrorism and radicalization. The rate and accessibility of 
radicalization and radicalized propaganda have exponentially grown throughout the modern era.  
 
 iii 
This study found that there are patterns amongst lone-wolf terrorism cognitive and 
behavior profiles with regard to their actions prior to executing violent attacks. These patterns 
include, but are not limited to, propaganda material sought online and radicalized thoughts 
regarding political or religious entities. Identifying common profile traits for vulnerable 
individuals can assist law enforcement in preventing future attacks by intervening with these 
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Radicalization often serves as the catalyst which formulates lone-wolf terrorists. As the 
modern technological era continuously introduces faster, easier means of communication across 
the globe, the rate and accessibility of radicalization have greatly increased. Much like the 
transformation definition of radicalization, what defines a lone-wolf terrorist has also adapted to 
the new world of differing political agendas and religious beliefs. As the process of 
radicalization and facilitation of full lone-wolf terrorism has expanded, the need for consistent 
monitoring, identification, and prevention has become evident.  
This thesis  explores the ideas surrounding lone-wolf terrorism, the misconceptions, 
definitions, methods, and future prevention. This analysis of historical and modern sources aims 
to identify the connectedness of personality and cognitive traits amongst historically significant 
lone-wolf terrorists. Furthermore, this study of historical and current literature will aim to 
develop a generalized profile of common sequential steps of radicalization. Finally,  a predictive 
analysis of apprehension and preventive measures implications for law enforcement in the future 
will be explored and established.  
 The topic of lone-wolf terrorism has been largely overshadowed by the media and 
academics with the rise of major terror organizations and the rise of state-sponsored terror. 
However, as media attention diverts away from lone-wolf terrorism, it continues to grow, 
develop and adapt to an ever-changing world. Lone-wolf terrorism continues to impact local, 
state, and federal government, as a potential threat to public safety. As the modern era continues 
to allow for increased accessibility to radicalized materials, the rate of radicalization of 
vulnerable individuals increases.1 
 
1  Meleagrou-Hitchens,Alexander, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai. 2017. “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment.”., 1234 
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Radicalization has been greatly impacted by the introduction of the internet, modern-day 
technology, and the evolution of communication.2 This has been a growing issue along with the 
growth of the internet.3 Now, with a smartphone in most pockets and much of the youth of the 
US being online, the potential of being radicalized may be a few clicks away. Long gone are the 
days where a terror group would have to wait for over-enthusiastic recruits to fly to a training 
camp and assimilate with their culture. With the use of the internet, terror groups could easily be 
right in front of you. Their propaganda can feed into the radical ideology, their training can 
prepare a person for a major incident.4 All of this, just because someone clicked a few times. 
Radicalization is not a process that is solely initiated, rather, every individual is radicalized to a 
particular degree, toward their personal, religious, or political beliefs. As explored throughout 
this thesis, the radicalization process is further pursued by the individual. It is the specific 
individual who seeks out radicalizing propaganda or chat rooms online. Thus, international terror 
groups or like-minded individuals are provided the opportunity to further coerce these vulnerable 
individuals to full radicalized thoughts and toward future potentially violent actions. This thesis 
will go into detail about the issues of radicalization and lone-wolf terrorism, as well as the use of 
the internet. It will also address how lone-wolf terrorism has impacted law enforcement 
prevention and investigations.  
Lone-wolf terrorism does not just affect countries thousands of miles away or across the 
globe, rather, it is a growing problem on American soil, throughout communities, and across the 
country. From a historical perspective, there are many consistencies amongst previous lone-wolf 
 
2  Meleagrou-Hitchens,Alexander, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai. 2017. “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment.”., 1234 
3  Frissen, Thomas. “Internet, the Great Radicalizer? Exploring Relationships between Seeking for Online Extremist 
Materials and Cognitive Radicalization in Young Adults.” ., 1 
4 Ibid., 1 
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terrorists, with regard to their cognitive, behavioral, and motivational profiles. Although 
radicalization has the potential to impact any given individual, there are those individuals who 
are at greater risk for developing radicalized thought processes, seeking out radical propaganda, 
and acting on violent intentions. Developing a profile of characteristics for these individuals will 
allow for identification and intervention before complete radicalization.  
Developing a profile for potential lone-wolf terror threats will allow law enforcement the 
opportunity to identify these individuals early in the radicalization process, which may decrease 
the rate of radicalization and the potential threats to public safety. Law enforcement currently 
utilizes meta-data analysis to determine keyword searches and monitor online activity.5 
However, establishing patterns by utilizing previous case studies allows for the identification of 
specific personality, cognitive and behavioral traits prior to the individuals seeking out 
propaganda. This will stop the complete radicalization process before proceeding past the 
general public radicalization, thus decreasing the likelihood of a violent attack. This paper seeks 
to demonstrate how identifying cohesive patterns of profiles amongst historical lone-wolf 
terrorists, can establish greater reliability with regard to apprehension, prevention, and 
decreasing the rate of radicalization in an increasingly digital era.  
 The methodology of this study consisted of utilizing existing primary and secondary 
resources as well as conducting an extensive analysis of case studies to establish predictive 
profiles and modern-day trends of lone-wolf terrorists. First, historical literature and case studies 
were collected to establish a foundational understanding of core vocabulary and previously 
analyzed information. Each historically significant case study was explored to determine the 
 
5  Metadata, Pomerantz, Jeffrey The MIT Press, 2015., 118-122 
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characteristics demonstrated in the radicalization individual, as well as the steps taken toward 
full radicalization. Additionally, analysis of historical resources, case studies, and reports, as well 
as primary and secondary sources allowed for the development and exploration of how 
establishing a predictive profile based on previous lone-wolf terrorists, can aid law enforcement 
in determining at-risk individuals in the modern era.  
In addition to historical literature and case studies, a review of the current literature was 
conducted to further explore the transforming trends of radicalization and law enforcement 
response. This review consisted of analyzing several current research studies, reviews of 
literature, and meta-analysis regarding lone-wolf terrorism and the impact the digital age has had 
on radicalization. Following literature and case-study review, common characteristics were 
identified amongst previous lone-wolf terrorists. Recommendations for future potential 
preventative measures were explored based on the historical and current literature as well.    
 This thesis begins within chapter II, defining the core vocabulary surrounding lone-wolf 
terrorism and, creating a profile of common characteristics of each specific type of lone-wolf 
terrorist. The definition of a lone-wolf terrorist depends on the radicalization process and the 
steps taken thereafter. This chapter was made to set the groundwork for further discussions to be 
had with a standard understanding of the basic terms and the generalized statistics and facts in 
the background of a lone-wolf terror attack.  
The first definitions to be explored are those that have transformed with modern-day 
terror, including but not limited to: terrorist, lone-wolf, terror groups, recruitment, and the 
differentiation amongst connected and inspired attacks. These terms must be defined to keep a 
standard groundwork of understanding when discussing the topics laid out in this thesis further. 
 
6 
Without standardized terms and definitions, a reader could go into the discussions with 
preconceived notions, non-specific understandings, and a lack of background on the topics 
covered.  There are multiple variations amongst the definition of a true lone-wolf terrorist. 
However, analysis of case studies, identification of action patterns, and study of motive and 
intent can lead to a concise definition of lone-wolf terrorism, and thus, establish common profiles 
amongst individuals. 
  Chapter III seeks to demonstrate that studying past acts of lone-wolf terror is 
essential to scaffolding upon previous insight, investigational gains and thus, preventing future 
attacks. Chapter III centralizes the idea of lone-wolf terrorism by assessing the radicalization 
process of historically significant lone-wolf terrorist attacks which occurred on American soil. 
Throughout this chapter, several case studies are reviewed to establish patterns in the 
radicalization process, comparative cognitive and behavioral traits as well as intention and 
motivation of the attacks. When analyzing the previous notions of terrorism, the profile of a 
lone-wolf terrorist often negates the generalized representation of what would be that most 
average perpetrator.   
Following the case study review, a statistical and historical understanding of lone-wolf 
terror attacks in the US during modern times is established. These facts and statistics cover a 
wide range of topics from targets, inspirations, demographics, and mental health profiles. These 
attacks happen relatively often and are usually not found on national news or spread widely on 
social media. This is partially due to the impact many of these attacks have been localized and, 
could be due in part to the definitions that the national news system has used to identify and 
cover lone-wolf attacks.  
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 Following analysis of historical case studies and throughout chapter IV, the ideas 
surrounding the rationalization process are discussed. Chapter IV  primarily centralizes on the 
digital aspect of the modern terrorism recruitment process and will cover topics such as: who is 
targeted, how they are primed for radicalization, what steps do recruiters take, and where there 
are shortfalls in the investigation apprehension and prevention of radicalization online. This has 
changed drastically throughout the modern era, as the introduction of the internet has 
exponentially grown the recruitment and radicalization rates and accessibility.6  
 The issue of digital radicalization is specifically important to the topic of lone-wolf 
terrorism because, without the internet, people would widely be radicalized by either people they 
know or self-radicalization. However, with the internet available to terror groups and future 
potential terrorists, it is now easier than ever for potentially increasingly radicalized individuals 
to find people who feel the same as they do.7 
To follow that, the sharing of information has allowed those who are radicalized to take 
action with ease. The technology that can become available to these lone wolves can be 
extremely deadly and all because of the ease in the transfer of information online. A troubled 
person can go from not liking those around them to being radicalized and taught how to build a 
bomb over a very short period. This conclusion, along with many others will paint a picture of a 
deadly issue that has its major loopholes for enforcement and investigations.  
The evolution of communication practices online has tremendously impacted the rate and 
means of radicalization for international terror groups. Often, radicalization is seen in online 
 
6  Frissen, Thomas. “Internet, the Great Radicalizer? Exploring Relationships between Seeking for Online Extremist 
Materials and Cognitive Radicalization in Young Adults.” ., 1 
7  Meleagrou-Hitchens,Alexander, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai. 2017. “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment.”., 1234 
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chatrooms or social media groups. This is due to the anonymity of chat rooms, in conjunction 
with the connectedness of interacting with like-minded individuals. Those at risk for extreme 
radicalization are more willing to ask questions, share thoughts and engage in deep conversation 
with the anonymous nature that chat rooms allow for.  
Much as the radicalization process has transformed throughout the modern era,  the law 
enforcement response has been adaptive. Law enforcement has introduced meta-data analysis to 
better track potential threats, identify individuals seeking out radicalized materials, and engaging 
in conversations with online terror recruiters. To overview chapter IV, the internet has had a 
tremendous impact on lone-wolf terrorism with regard to prevention and apprehension. 










































There are two major types of lone terror threats: the terrorists with a network of 
organized terror behind them and true self-radicalized, untrained combatants. Given this 
information and knowledge, how could counter-terror efforts be adjusted to better address these 
two encampments, and what steps can be taken to identify and label such threats better? Lone-
wolf terrorism is often mislabeled as a lone gunman, school shooter, or mass murderer. This 
analysis aims to better define lone-wolf terrorism and the terms associated with it, while also 
exploring the meanings of terms such as “terror network supported,” “terror organization 
inspired” and “self-radicalized”. Furthermore, this analysis will explore the tactics used by 
groups associated with these terms and attempt to produce an analysis that could both aid in 
identifying these threats and create profiles for people to be put into.  
There are multiple variations amongst the definition of a true lone-wolf terrorist. 
However, analysis of case studies, identification of action patterns, and study of motive and 
intent can lead to a concise definition of lone-wolf terrorism, and thus, establish common profiles 













Introduction and Defining Terrorism 
The definition of terrorism can be a debated topic with several different viewpoints. 
Points of contention arise when trying to formulate an explicit definition of constitutes terrorism 
and when an individual is considered a terrorist. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines 
domestic terrorism in this way, “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to 
further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, 
religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”8 This supports that the rationale behind an 
attack must be stemming from ideological implications. Attacks with ideological motivations can 
take various forms, however, those who aim to make social or political change are considered 
terrorism, as defined by the FBI.9 
 With this definition accepted as standard, it is imperative to explore the term “lone-wolf 
terrorist.” Civilians may assume it is a terrorist who is acting alone, however, further clarification 
is necessary to differentiate individual terrorists from lone-wolf terrorists. The paper, Loners, 
Colleagues, or Peers? Assessing the Social Organization of Radicalization offers insight into 
this topic. Three distinct variations of lone-wolf terrorists can be identified. First, an individual 
who is self-radicalized, self-organized, and acts completely alone can be categorized as a 
“loner”10 The loner has no co-conspirators or people to train them. Secondly, the classification of 
“colleagues” is given to those who work closely with others, often via the internet to develop 
 
8 FBI “Terrorism.”  
9 Ibid. 
10 Holt, Thomas J., Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Colleen Mills, and Jason Silva, Loners, Colleagues, or 
Peers? Assessing the Social Organization of Radicalization 
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plans and share knowledge.11 Lone-wolf terrorists classified as “colleagues” frequently lack 
organizational skills but demonstrate strength in structure when compared to the “loner” 
classification. Lastly, those who are genuine, active members of established terror organizations, 
but choose to work alone are classified as “peers”.12 When compared to “loner” or “colleague” 
terrorists, these individuals often receive formal training and are likely to be well organized, and 
have structure. Nevertheless, one could argue that the “peer” is not necessarily a lone-wolf 
terrorist. The training and support they receive from their organization make them comparable to 
a terrorist who happens to be working alone while conducting an attack. The individuals who 
have the training and outside support are far more prepared than their true lone-wolf terror 
counterparts. However, they are on this list because they do act alone in an attack.  
 Given the aforementioned definitions, the profile of a lone-wolf terrorist can be 
formulated. A lone-wolf terrorist is an individual who commits or has plans to commit an act of 
terrorism with the full intention of acting alone. Even with the support and training of a larger 
organization, an individual attempting or perpetrating an act of terrorism would be considered a 
“lone-wolf” terrorist. This may seem odd but, when a terrorist is acting alone they are a type of 
lone-wolf terrorist. While this goes against conventional thought on the topic, one example is: a 
man who reaches out to a terror organization because they would like to commit an act of terror. 
He receives information about potential targets, ways in which to commit the act itself, and all of 
the training necessary to be successful in their intentions. If they then goes on to act alone he is 
still a lone-wolf terrorist because he is acting without others or direct leadership.  
 
11 Ibid. 
12Holt, Thomas J., Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Colleen Mills, and Jason Silva, Loners, Colleagues, or 
Peers? Assessing the Social Organization of Radicalization 
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There are multiple variations amongst the definition of a true lone-wolf terrorist. 
However, analysis of case studies, identification of action patterns and study of motive and intent 
can lead to a concise definition of lone-wolf terrorism, and thus, establish common profiles 
amongst individuals.  
The definition of a lone-wolf terrorist was expanded following the introduction of the 
Lone-Wolf Amendment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.13 During these attacks, one terrorist, 
by the name of Moussaoui, could not be identified as a card-carrying member of any specific 
terror organization.14 However, influenced to act by way of sympathy with a terror group but not 
on their behalf. Thus, Moussaoui appeared to be acting as a lone-wolf, impacted by radicalized 
thoughts influenced by terror groups, but acting solely, without explicit standing structures in 
place.15   
 Following the prosecution of Moussaoui, the definition of lone-wolf terrorism was 
expanded to include, “any non-U.S. person who engages in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefore.”16 Previously, a demonstration of explicit connections to terror 
organizations was an essential component to the definition of lone-wolf terror.17 However, since 
incorporating the Lone Wolf Amendment into law, the definition has since been broadened to 
include individuals similar to Moussaoui, eliminating the components of the definition related to 
foreign terror organization affiliation.18 
 
13 Bellia, Patricia. “The Lone Wolf Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law.” 
digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu, 2005., 425-428  
14 Ibid., 426-427 
15  Ibid., 426-427 
16   Ibid., 426-427 
17   Ibid., 427 
18   Ibid., 426-427 
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In regards to the definition of lone-wolf terrorism as it relates to international terrorism, where 
the distinction is important is when it relates to surveillance. The FISA includes a distinction of 
what an “agent of a foreign power” is and that it is lawful for intelligence agencies to conduct 
surveillance on such subjects that meet the strict scrutiny of that definition.19 This legal 
definition can be expanded to include subjects that may not necessarily meet the definition of a 
foreign actor but do not fit into the box of domestic terrorist as the FBI has defined.20  
The Profile of a Lone-Wolf Terrorist 
Further development and exploration into the profile of a terrorist is needed to gain a 
better understanding of these individuals. This will allow law enforcement to formulate a better 
understanding of who a suspect may be in regard to a lone-wolf attack. To demonstrate this 
point, when encountering an act of terror, the suspect evades police, however, they are still 
known to be within the vicinity. The police establish roadblocks and begin to check cars and 
pedestrians. If an officer is going into the situation blind, they would stop every person, thus 
conducting an inefficient and time-consuming search. However, if a profile of the suspect is 
developed, the logistics of the search effort would be more efficient and effective.  
 In an effort to develop an informed profile of a lone-wolf terrorist, the information that 
will be used are statistics from a comprehensive report written by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations studying the characteristics of a lone-wolf terrorist. The study focuses on the 
following characteristics: gender, age, race, citizenship status, education, religious affiliation, 
mental health, and substance abuse. Establishing a profile can benefit many people with 
preconceived notions of lone-wolf terrorists. This study used an aggregated system of all lone-
 
19  Ibid., 426-427 
20  “Terrorism.” FBI. FBI, May 3, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism.  
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wolf terror attacks within the US between 1972 and 2015.21 Those included in the study 
conducted by the FBI were selected because they were determined to have committed a lone act 
of terror within the US. 22 These terrorists could have been helped by terror organizations but, as 
defined by the FBI, although a terrorist may have support and training from a larger organization 
does not mean they are not, in fact, a lone-wolf terrorist.23 The information will be compiling and 
utilizing demographic statistics from the generalized American population to compare to each 
grouping the FBI offers.  
For the fifty-two individuals within the study, FBI determined that all offenders were 
men.24 In comparison, ~49.2% of the US population are men 25 With regard to the age of 
terrorists, the FBI has stated that the average age of a lone-wolf terrorist is approximately 26 
years old.26 The average age among Americans is ~38 years old, which supports a notable 
difference when comparing the average age amongst lone-wolf terrorists and the general 
population.27  
Next, the study analyzes the racial and citizenship status of fifty-two individuals. For 
citizenship, 90% of lone-wolf terrorists were born within the United States .28 This is compared 
to the 86% of Americans who were born within the United States29. In terms of racial statistics, 
approximately 60% of the attackers were white with the next largest grouping being Middle 
Eastern. The remaining racial groups have relatively low counts of lone-wolf actors.30 Compared 
 
21 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 1-30. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
23 Ibid., 10. 
24 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 12. 
25 Census Bureau QuickFacts  
26 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 12. 
27 Duffin, Erin. “Median Age of the U.S. Population 1960-2018.” 
28 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 14. 
29 “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States.” www.census.gov 
30 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 14. 
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to the statistics offered by the US Census,~76% of Americans are white, while Asians (Middle 
Eastern people are included as an aggregate) are represented by 5.9% of the general population.31 
The education statistics of lone-wolf terrorists showed the majority of those studied had at least 
their associate’s degree, but, 37% of the terrorists had at least their bachelor’s degree with 14% 
having their master’s or doctoral degree.32 This, compared to the generalized US population 
where around ~31% had at least a bachelor’s degree.33  
 The FBI study also analyzed religious affiliation, determining that 50% of all studied 
being affiliated with Christianity with Islam being the next largest grouping at 35%.34 
Approximately 37% of those in the study were affiliated with the military, most of those being 
members of the Army.35 This shows a stark difference from the rest of the American population 
~70% of Americans identify with some kind of Christianity while only ~0.9% of Americans 
identify with a kind of Islam.36 
The psychiatric profile, regarding diagnosis, of these individuals, is notably low. Of all 
lone-wolf terrorists, 25% have a mental health diagnosis and of that 25%, only 38% were 
receiving professional treatment for their diagnosis.37 An argument that is often made regarding 
lone-wolf terrorism is that it is a mental health issue rather than a political or religious one. Now, 
an argument can be made that those who were not diagnosed were in a situation where they were 
unable to receive a diagnosis. According to Johns Hopkins University Medicine, 25% of 
Americans have a diagnosable mental health disorder.38 This suggests that the group of people in 
 
31 Census Bureau QuickFacts 
32 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 16. 
33 Census Bureau QuickFacts 
34 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 17. 
35 Ibid., 17. 
36 Pew Research, “Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics, and Statistics.” 
37 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 22. 
38 Johns Hopkins Medicine, “Mental Health Disorder Statistics.” 
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the study are not abnormal when it comes to the mental health statistics within America. In post, 
family members and mental health professionals had determined that several other members of 
the study are believed to have a mental health disorder which would potentially bring the total 
number to around 63% when including unofficial diagnoses and postmortem speculation about 
the subjects.39 In addition to their mental health concerns, around half of all lone-wolf terrorists 
had some form of substance abuse before their attacks. Furthermore, 44% of attackers had a 
history of hard drug use including but not limited to Methamphetamine, LSD, Cocaine, and 
Ecstasy.40 
So, now a profile has been developed containing a list of characteristics officers can keep 
in mind when identifying a person involved in lone-wolf terrorism. Presumably, they are 
between the ages of 20-30, most likely white, male, display possible signs of drug use, and are 
possibly ex-military. Utilizing this profile will allow an officer to focus on suspects that fit this 
description, thus narrowing their search down to a few likely suspects. Relying on a terrorist 
profile supported by evidence is essential within law enforcement as it allows for the 
identification of a suspect efficiently which can save lives and time following an incident.  
Typology of Leadership Within Lone-Wolf Terrorism 
Terror networks are utilized by terror groups and many lone-wolf terrorists to spread 
hate, help radicalize, share their message, and organize acts of violence. These terror networks 
attempt to give structure to the members within and, in doing so, help organize the efforts of 
members to maximize their effect. These effects can be magnified by leadership and training 
networks within these terror organizations.41 It will be explored, through research, the ways in 
 
39 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 23. 
40 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”., 26. 
41 Combs, Cynthia. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Centry, 368-371. 
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which terror groups radicalize, train, and recruit would-be lone-wolf terrorism and, explore the 
fascinating section of lone-wolf terrorism that lacks training or the support of terror networks.  
 Within radicalization, there are several ways an organization can initiate communication 
and influence someone. Additionally, there are many ways in which a person can self-radicalize. 
According to Cynthia Combs in Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, there are several 
different ways a person can take up with a terror group.42 She says, “there is no single catalyst 
for being involved in a group. Often the desire to belong to a group and to socialize may prompt 
an individual to become involved.”43  
Analyzing groups like The Islamic State and how they quickly turn unaffiliated citizens 
into terrorists can facilitate a deeper understanding of the recruitment process. The Islamic State 
is known to take members of the general public and radicalize them rather quickly.44 As said in 
the Combs book, people tend to want something different, a group to be a part of and support 
their ideology.45’46 The recent development of accessible internet has allowed terror groups to 
efficiently weaponize normal digital communication targeting vulnerable groups of people in an 
attempt to radicalize them.47 The Islamic State became professionals at taking what is said in 
holy books associated with Islam and making that information fit their narrative that The United 
States and the western world had been unjustifiably invading their land and killing their people.48 
As a former Islamic State recruiter said in a New York Times interview, once an individual joins 
a conversation for the second time, the recruiter knows that they have them ‘on the hook.’ The 
 
42 Ibid., 368-371 
43 Combs, Cynthia. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Centry., 369. 
44 Callimachi, Rukmini. “Caliphate: Chapter 2, ‘Recruitment’”. 4m00s 
45 Ibid., 6m-8m 
46 Combs, Cynthia. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Centry, 368-371. 
47 Callimachi, Rukmini. “Caliphate: Chapter 2, ‘Recruitment’”. 7m-8m 
48 Ibid., 10m-11m 
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recruiter knows that once they return to initiate further communication, they can be radicalized.49 
During these early stages in recruitment, the conversations and signs of radicalization when a 
group is involved the lone actor tends to not be careful; this could be a lack of training on their 
part because once the radicalization has started the conversations quickly move to more covert 
means.50 
Threat Assessment 
 Within the United States, the three primary motivators for lone-wolf terrorism are anti-
government, violent extremism, and radical Islam.51 Assessing these three major reasons for 
attacking it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of their ideological motivations and 
the targets of the attacks. The Department of Homeland Security specifies the targets of lone-
wolf terrorism and the main motivations for attacking said targets while Homeland Security 
compares the findings with those from group-based terrorism. The largest percentages for the 
motivations behind lone-wolf attacks are found in two major categories, abortion-related and 
anti-government.52  
 For these lone actors, the demonstrated violence often can be classified into three distinct 
categories, two of which are far more prevalent than the rest. First, there are infrastructure-based 
attacks, which account for approximately 49% of all lone-wolf terror attacks.53 Next are 
Bombings and explosives, which account for 36% of attacks within lone-wolf terror54. The last 
mode of attacking that has statistical significance is armed violence, including shootings when 
 
49 Ibid., 10m-11m 
50 Zeman, Tomáš, Jan Břeň, and Rudolf Urban. “Role of Internet in Lone-Wolf Terrorism.” 
51 FBI, “Lone Offender Terrorism Report.”, 33. 
52 US Department of Homeland Security. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 10 
53 Ibid., 10, 11 
54 Ibid., 11 
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considered terrorism and when the person in question is acting alone, which accounts for around 
9% of all lone-wolf terror attacks.55 
Case Studies  
 The following are case studies that showcase the fine line between operative and lone-
wolf terrorist. This is done to prove the concept that a lone-wolf terrorist can be inspired, trained 
and directed by terror networks and still be considered lone-wolves. The following will prove 
that concept while also highlighting some of the strengths of al-Qaeda as a component of lone-
wolf terrorism.  
Nidal Malik Hasan 
On November 5, 2009, Dr. Nidal Malik Hasan a Major in the U.S. Army had entered Fort 
Hood and gunned down 13 people and injured an additional 42 others.56  Dr. Hasan was a U.S. 
Army physician who was due to be deployed to Afghanistan in October, one month after the 
attack.57 Dr. Hassan had open communications with a known terrorist and so-called cleric Anwar 
al-Awlaki.58 At the time of the attack on Fort Hood, al-Awlaki was the number two most wanted 
terrorist by U.S. authorities.59 Their communications included details and discussions on the 
justification of attacks and tactics, the exact details of the attack that Dr. Hassan would end up 
perpetrating.60 
The attack on Fort Hood shows the ability for an individual to be self-radicalized with the 
support and coercion of outside actors. Though Dr. Hasan did have connections to a known 
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terrorist, Anwar al-Awlaki; he still acted alone and is considered a lone-wolf terrorist.61 This 
example provides a clear cut lone-wolf attack that was inspired by the ideology being pushed by 
outside actors. Though Dr. Hassan had connections to major terror actors, he had committed the 
act alone, not as a soldier of a terror group, but as an individual. An individual who had believed 
his actions would be praised and held up as actions of glory and be hailed as a martyr.  
Naser Jason Abdo 
 Following the Dr. Hassan shooting in 2009, in 2012 there was another terror incident in 
the Fort Hood area.62 Private Naser Jason Abdo had planned to plant a bomb in a restaurant in 
the Fort Hood area that is frequented by U.S. Army personnel, once the bomb went off he had 
planned to shoot all of the survivors. The plan was thwarted by law enforcement but, in a 
subsequent hearing, Abdo had spoken fondly of Dr. Hasan and his messaging.63 
 Abdo had attempted to claim conscientious objector status to avoid a tour of duty in the 
Middle East but this status had been delayed due to pending charges.64 The plot was found to be 
inspired by both Dr. Hasan and, al-Qaed’s online publication entitled “make a bomb in your 
mom’s kitchen”.65 There are many connections between Abdo’s planned attack and the Dr. 
Hasan attack though, not directly planned in tandem, and the two had no formal connection to 
one another.  
Jose Pimentel (Muhammad Yusuf) 
Another plot that was stopped before it came to fruition is the 2011 case of Jose Pimentel, 
or Muhammad Yusuf. Yusuf had plotted to kill members of the military who were returning 
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home from Afghanistan.66 He was radicalized by propaganda releases by al-Qaeda and had been 
heavily influenced by Anwar al-Awlaki, much like the other two cases that have been 
reviewed.67 Yusuf had planned a series of bombings, choosing targets such as public transit, post 
offices and, police stations.68 These targets and the weaponry used were planned using online 
media posted by al-Qaeda in the English magazine, Inspire.69 This is the same magazine used by 
several other terrorists in the US, including the Tsarnaev  brothers in their attack on the Boston 
Marathon in 2013.70 Yousuf was apprehended prior to any action taken on the plot to bomb the 
locations selected; during the investigation, which included a year of surveillance, law 
enforcement made the connection that Yusef was inspired and was receiving resources from al-
Qaeda.71 
Adel Daoud 
 Adel Daoud, is another case that has direct connection to al-Qaeda but attempted to act 
alone.72 Daoud, a Chicago native and, particularly young, only 18 at the time of his arrest in 
2012.73 The Daoud case begins much like the others covered, Daoud had researched al-Qaeda 
and their writings and had landed on the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki.74 He went further by 
reaching out to, what he thought at the time, was an al-Qaeda operative in his region.75 This al-
Qaeda operative was actually an undercover FBI agent who had been in communication with 
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Daoud regarding al-Awlaki’s work as well as more extreme ideas.76 The conversations between 
the two quickly turned to targeting and weaponry.77 Daoud had planned to bomb a bar in the 
Chicago area and had planned to get the explosives from the FBI agent who he believed was a al-
Qaeda operative. Daoud had parked the car full of fake explosives in front of the bar and when 
he attempted to detonate the bomb, he was arrested.78 The most recent update from the Daoud 
case is that in 2020, a federal appeals court determined that Daoud’s sentence of 16 years was 
not long enough, so a new trial will be set in the near future.79 
Ahmad Khan Rahami 
 The last case that will be covered in this chapter is the case of Ahmad Khan Rahami, an 
Afghanistan born man turned terrorist in 2016.80 Rahami differs from the other cases covered 
above because Rahami had traveled back and forth to Pakistan and Afghanistan during his 
radicalization and training.81 The other way in which Rahami differs from the others is that he 
carried out his plot to completion.82 Rahami had targeted several locations in New York and New 
Jersey, planting four bombs and leaving six others unarmed in a trash can on his escape.83 Out of 
the four bombs that were planted and due to explode, two had gone off, one in the path of a 
Marine 5k charity run in Seaside New Jersey and the other, a very large weapon was exploded in 
the Chelsea district in New York City.84 The first bomb, in New Jersey went off without injury 
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injuring 30 people and damaging several properties.86 The other weapons were discovered and 
disposed of prior to their detonation.87 
 The Rahami case has several key elements that in one sense make it distinctly different 
than the others but, in many ways, is quite similar. Much like the other lone-wolves covered 
previously, Rahami had gotten much of his inspiration from al-Qaeda and Anwar al-Awlaki.88 
Rahami had been reported several times by family members, who worried that Rahami had 
become radicalized.89 They saw the warning signs but law enforcement did not follow Rahami’s 
movements close enough to see the attack coming.90 
Review of the Case Studies  
All of these examples have one key component in common, they all acted alone but had 
the support or inspiration from a large terror organization. This ties together all of the definitions 
and points that were set out in the beginning. Just because a terrorist or a would-be terrorist does 
not fully act alone, does not mean that they are not a lone-wolf. Those listed above had 
connections to terror networks and can even be trained by terror groups. Ultimately, these are 
self-radicalized, actors who had used the terror organizations for their resources and teachings. 
Every one of these terrorists had acted alone in their plots and had used the teachings of al-Qaeda 
and, more specifically, Anwar al-Awlaki. Anwar al-Awlaki was the most prolific recruiter for his 
sect of al-Qaeda and was a major inspiration for many modern terrorists, lone-wolves or others. 












 Lone-wolf terrorism, although not a recently developed concept, is changing and 
adapting to the modern world. With advanced technologies and counter-terrorism efforts, the 
lone-wolf terrorist has become amongst the most effective ways in which a terror organization 
can operate.92 Due to the effectiveness of using lone-wolf terrorists, there has been an increase in 
recruitment and radicalization. Thus, the United States and other global nations must create 
counter-terrorism strategies which adapt to the changing nature of the digital age and increased 
presence of lone-wolf terror .93’94 Analyzing modern documented cases of lone-wolf terrorism 
allows for the development of a comprehensive profile of potential terrorists. Within this paper, 
it was discussed through research and analysis demographic details that give an overview of 
what a lone-wolf terrorist most likely will look like and what their background is. Within the 
next chapter, It will address the similarities between different lone-wolf terrorists and what can 
be taken away from those similarities. it will also be discussed also the potential legislative 
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Chapter III:  
Lone-Wolf Terrorism: 















Executive Summary  
Analyzing the past has the potential to facilitate greater comprehension of future events. 
An exploration of the current literature was conducted to develop a better understanding of 
research within the field of lone-wolf terror. Through this research, the lone-wolf profile is 
characterized into four distinctive classifications, which allows for a deeper interpretation of 
motives and the process of radicalization. The application of this research is seen via a thorough 
investigation of three modern case studies within this chapter. Furthermore, the specific motives 
and tactics which were utilized will be examined to explore ways in which law enforcement 
could be more effective against these terrorists in the future. To prevent future acts of lone-wolf 
terror, it is essential to analyze past cases and determine patterns amongst strategies, motivates, 
















 Lessons from the past can be applied to better approach the future. As previously 
discussed, lone-wolf terrorism is a far greater threat than is represented in counter-terror efforts. 
Analyzing current research and literature, as well as exploring past events, such as the three case 
studies described below, will allow for the development of a deeper understanding of future 
events and thus increase preventative measures. Three distinctive case studies which could aid in 
facilitating this understanding are Timothy McVeigh, Dylann Roof, and Omar Mateen. These 
lone-wolf terrorists were chosen due to their differences in motive and tactics. The varying 
natures of these cases lend way to inclusive and comprehensive conclusions that are the aim of 
this work. Additionally, the selected aforementioned subjects allow for analysis of established 
research and meta-analysis which will aid in the research and development of a lone-wolf 
profile.  
 Lastly, an extensive exploration into law enforcement responses, the systematic approach 
to apprehension, and the progression of investigation of specific lone-wolf terror cases may lead 
to a better response in the future. This analysis that will be provided will offer insight into the 
question of if the lessons from the past are applicable to more modern lone-wolf terrorism 
prevention tactics. Furthermore, analysis of the terrorists, such as  Timothy McVeigh, Dylann 
Roof, and Omar Mateen, can generate patterns of strategies, motives, and investigational 
approaches. The study of three vastly different cases will allow for useful insight into the attacks,  
investigations, and apprehension across various situational contexts. Studying past acts of lone-
wolf terror is essential to scaffolding upon previous insight, investigational gains and thus, 
preventing future attacks.  
Exploration of Lone-Wolf Definitions 
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 The literary focus of this review can be designated into an exploration of definitions, 
tactics, and categorizing the terror suspects. The tactics, as stated, can either be the tactics used 
by the terrorists or, the counter-terror tactics employed to stop lone-wolves before the act. These 
reviews are imperative to the foundational understanding of this paper. . The analysis of research 
will aid in generating definitions and categorizations to determine which counter-terror methods 
may be most effective against some of America’s most infamous lone-wolves.  
 Within Raffaello Pantucci’s work, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of 
Lone Islamist Terrorists, many of the topics that are covered in this thesis are touched upon. 
Throughout this work, Pantucci examines the definition of lone-wolf terrorists.95 Patucci stated 
four distinctive categories for lone-wolf terrorists: the loner, the lone-wolf, the lone-wolf pack, 
and the lone attacker.96 These definitions facilitate a comprehensive exploration of the attackers 
many refer to as ‘lone-wolves’. For instance, the loner attacker is the most disconnected when 
compared to the others described. Thus, they act completely alone with no influence or direction 
from others or groups.97 The lone-wolf is comparative to the loner, however, they may have 
contact or be heavily influenced by extremist groups.98 The lone-wolf pack refers to those who 
are self-radicalized.99 Included within this group are those who rationalized friends or family 
against a group of people or spread anarchist ideologies that others will be willing to act on. 
Lastly, the title of lone attacker describes a single individual who is acting on direct orders by a 
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group or coordinator.100 These people usually have a connection to an extremist group and will 
be pushing a specific ideology.101 
 There are many reasons for an individual to commit a lone-wolf act, as demonstrated in 
Dancing with the Wolves: Today’s Lone-Wolf Terrorists by Rodger A. Bates. In this report, 
Bates covers different reasonings for terror attacks and attempts to categorize all lone-wolf 
terrorists within a demonstrated model.102 This model, an eight pronged chart, places terrorists on 
a scale from self-radicalization to group radicalization on the X-axis, on the Y-axis is the 
motivation from self-interests to ideology pushing.103 On the other two axes are the career 
terrorists to the chaos based ones and on the other is determining how planned a terror act is, 
from avoiding major risk to major risk taking.104 This chart offers important insight into the 
determination of how a lone-wolf terrorist acts and how their actions fit in among others who fit 
into the category of lone-wolf terrorist.105  
 Within the work A Response to ‘Key Issues and Research Agendas in Lone-Wolf 
Terrorism by Michael Becker, he responds to an article used within this thesis to highlight the 
ambiguity of the definitions behind lone-wolf terrorist.106 The definitions targeted for this 
criticism is not just the lone-wolf terrorist distinction but, terrorism as a whole.107 Becher argues 
that there is no agreed upon definition of lone-wolf terrorist and that there is still no universal 
definition of terrorist.108 Becker examines and lends way to further questions as to who the lone-
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wolf terrorist is and how to approach the growing issue. According to this article, regardless of 
what that definition is, it could be wrong or at least heavily questioned.109 What this article 
highlights in particular is that there is still a debate into the definitions of terrorism and lone-wolf 
terrorism, both of which are at the core of this thesis.110 
In Edwin Bakker’s Perspectives on terrorism: Preventing Lone-Wolf Terrorism Bakeker 
recognizes that there is a lack of a profile for a lone-wolf terrorist and, that the there are 
categories that these terrorists can be put in.111 Bakker explains that as of 2011, the rise of lone-
wolf attack in the US is due in part by the rise of the extreme rightwing groups that offer radical 
ideologies to their members.112 Another point made, is the consistent presence of Islamist circles 
which produce terrorists, which has been relatively consistent.113 Bakker also reviews the 
potential counter-terror response. As previously demonstrated, one productive approach to 
analyzing lone-wolf counter-terrorism is through the communications used.114 Catching the 
communication between the potential terrorist and the person or group that they communicate 
with is critical to countering such attacks.115 Bakker also recognizes that even with the best 
counter terror measures, the issue of lone-wolf terrorism will not be solved.116 
Methodology 
 The base of this paper will be based on three case studies of lone-wolf terrorists within 
the United States. Case studies will be utilized because they can provide context and insight into 
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real-life examples of tactics of both the terrorists and law enforcement.117 This will provide the 
opportunity to analyze practical and theory based answers to questions surrounding topics within 
lone-wolf terrorism.118 Furthermore, a particular emphasis will be placed upon the investigations 
that followed the terror incident, which will grant valuable insight into the ways in which law 
enforcement have approached the lone-wolf issue in the past. Each case study will have a form 
of the following questions: why did they do the attack; what tactics did they employ; law 
enforcement response/investigations; and a formal analysis.  
 The culmination of all of this information paired with the other terror profiles that will be 
created in this thesis will aid in the discussions on counter-terror tactics. These three major terror 
incidents are all distinctly different with regard to motives, tactics and outcomes. This is why the 
decision was made to include these three for an analysis into the American lone-wolf terrorist. 
Another key area considered is the time period of the attacks. Both the Roof and Mateen attacks 
were in the last ten years while the McVeigh attack was more than twenty five years ago. This is 
an important point to keep in mind because, since 1995, tactics and counter terrorism has 
changed quite a bit. Even with that, there are still valuable lessons to be learned from the 
McVeigh attack and the attack offers modern investigatory applications.  
 A particular concentration will be placed on the Roof and Mateen attacks, as these are 
two modern attacks that needed more detail and context than what most people have. The Roof 
attack offered helpful insight into the investigations and apprehension of a suspect post attack. 
While the Mateen attack shows a different use of strategies and a lack of apprehension. The 
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ending of the Mateen attack is what counter terror teams attempt to avoid because it leaves a lot 
of unanswered questions and leaves possible threats still on the table.  
Timothy McVeigh and The Oklahoma City Bombing 
 Known Motive 
On April 19th, 1995, Timothy McVeigh committed an act of terrorism that took the lives 
of 168 people.119’120 This act of terrorism is referred to as the Oklahoma City Bombing. 
McVeigh has several co-conspirators but had introduced the ideas and committed the act 
alone.121 McVeigh was not directly associated with any political group but had expressed anti-
federal government sentiment as his reasoning for the attack.122 April 19th had been the date that 
McVeigh had chosen due to the fact that April 19th was the date of the end of the Waco, Texas 
incident.123 The other reason McVeigh saw significance in that date was that an execution was 
scheduled for a terrorist who had targeted the same building that McVeigh was targeting.124  
Tactics, Methods, and Targets 
Timothy McVeigh had chosen his target and, the way in which he wanted to commit his 
act of terror, all that was left was the materials for the act.125 The explosives were described by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations as “a deadly cocktail of agricultural fertilizer, diesel fuel, 
and other chemicals.”126 The bomb itself was reportedly made of ~4,800 pounds of ammonium 
nitrate and diesel fuel.127 The building that was targeted by McVeigh was the Alfred P. Murrah 
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Federal Building, this building was chosen due to McVeigh’s hatred of the federal government 
and the previous plot to bomb said building from other terrorists.128’129 The Oklahoma City 
Bombing was the terror attack with the most fatalities in the US prior to September 11, 2001.130 
 Apprehension 
Timothy McVeigh was caught in an unconventional way, when the FBI and other law 
enforcement had honed in on their search for McVeigh while he was already in jail due to a 
traffic stop shortly after the bombing.131 He was arrested for illegally possessing a firearm and 
was reportedly close to being released from the jail when law enforcement narrowed their search 
to McVeigh being their prime suspect.132  
Law enforcement came to the conclusion that McVeigh was their suspect in a traditional 
manner. Law enforcement took personal accounts of seeing the suspect leave the truck at the 
Murrah Building and continued their search by utilizing the FBI behavioral investigations tactics 
to determine that McVeigh was former/current military, white, relatively young and possibly a 
member of a militia group.133 The profile built and the descriptions given gave the FBI the 
opportunity to make the description public to see if the public could aid in identifying the 
suspect.134 Two people who aided in the identification of Timothy McVeigh are the manager of 
the motel he had been staying at for several nights prior to the attack, and a former coworker 
who had identified him via a picture.135 When McVeigh was approached by lawyers and 
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questioned about the bombing, he admitted to the bombing.136 Once identified, McVeigh’s 
associates were also quickly identified and, with further investigation of their homes, direct links 
between McVeigh and the bombing were discovered.137 
What We Learned From The Attack 
A major impact from the McVeigh attack was the impact of evidence collection done by 
the FBI.138 This one investigation had many investigators, “more than 1,400” according to the 
FBI.139 The evidence the FBI had collected was in the literal tons, so it was a lot to work with but 
also, rather difficult to figure out what was actually important to the investigation of who had 
done the bombing.140 This is where one piece of clever evidence had come into play, the rear 
axle of the Ryder rental truck McVeigh had used.141 This axle had the Vehicle Identification 
Number (VIN) affixed to part of it.142 This had allowed the investigators to go through the DMV 
to determine ownership and a description of the truck.143 This brought the investigators to the 
rental shop where they got a description and the name of McVeigh.144  
To continue the investigation, the FBI had conducted over 28,000 interviews with a 
search of millions of hotel guest registrations, airline registrations and rental truck records.145 
This investigation had encompassed all of the FBI’s resources at the time and had come to who 
their suspect was within a very short period of time, around a day.146 
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This exercise in the FBI’s power had offered a successful trial and execution of 
McVeigh.147 Without the evidence and groundwork that was put into this case, the bombing may 
have taken far longer to solve or to prosecute. One important aspect of the Oklahoma City 
Bombing is that even without modern tracking and surveillance, the FBI was still efficient 
enough to catch McVeigh quickly. Technology is not essential to determine and track a criminal, 
though it may seem that way for ‘random’ acts of terror such as this one. McVeigh was given the 
charges of eleven counts of murder, and conspiracy of using a weapon of mass destruction.148 
The judge had handed down a death sentence that had followed through, June of 2001.149 The 
McVeigh terror attack offered a plethora of knowledge when it comes to the investigation of 
bombings, and tracking suspects of seemingly random acts of terror both have applicable uses 
within modern investigations.  
The most important takeaway from the McVeigh attack was the efficiency of the 
investigators and law enforcement. Although it was 1995 and the US had no modern terror 
incidents that were to this scale, the investigators were able to track McVeigh as the perpetrator 
in relatively little time. The investigators were able to go through bulk deposits of records to link 
McVeigh to the crime even though at that point they were just trying to find the suspect, not 
build a perfect case.  
Dylann Roof, Charleston Church Shooting  
Known Motive 
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 On June 17th, 2015, Dylann Roof committed an act of terror at a traditionally black 
church located in Charleston, South Carolina.150’151 Roof’s intentions were made clear by his 
announcement prior to his shooting; when he reportedly said he was there “to shoot black 
people” and continued by saying “Y’all are raping our women and taking over the country. This 
must be done.”152 Roof continues to explain why he committed the act of terror by proclaiming 
that it was an attempt to start a “race war”153 
 To further the reasoning of his act, Dylann Roof had created a manifesto in support of 
white supremacy in the United States.154 The church itself was selected due to its historical 
importance to slave rebellions and the civil rights movement, in fact the date of the attack 
corresponded with a famous slave rebellion that involved the church.155These details were made 
clear by the manifesto he had written prior to the attack.156 
 Tactics, Methods, and Targets 
 It was reported that Dylann Roof had used a Glock semi-automatic .45 caliber pistol to 
carry out the shooting.157 Roof told an officer after the shooting the reason he had used that 
weapon was due to his inability to afford a larger weapon.158 Roof reportedly spent around an 
hour within the church participating in a bible study with the partitioners.159 After the hour spent 
with the partitioners of the church Roof had made his proclamations and began shooting, he 
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ultimately killed nine of the church goers.160’161 Allegedly, when Roof concluded his terror act, 
he had attempted to kill himself with a self-inflicted gunshot but had run out of ammunition.162 
One parishioner was quoted saying, “his plan was never to leave that church”163. 
 The Apprehension and Trial of Dylann Roof 
 The investigations very quickly led to Dylann Roof being the prime suspect in the 
shooting, he was identified and a warrant was issued for his arrest.164’165 The morning after the 
shooting, Roof was pulled over in North Carolina, approximately 250 miles from the 
church.166’167 When apprehended, without incident, the firearm used in the shooting was 
discovered unhidden within Roof’s vehicle.168  
 After he was arrested there was large debate on whether the attack ought to be considered 
a hate crime or an act of domestic terrorism. The FBI director at the time of charging had said 
that as of that point there was nothing necessarily linking Roof’s actions being politically 
motivated.169 Though the claim is made “the attack unambiguously fits the FBI’s and USA 
Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism”170 
What We Learned from The Attack 
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 One major take away at the time was a realization that race based terrorism was still very 
much alive within the US. This realization has led to more investigations into instances such as 
the string of arson attacks against traditionally black churches in the south.171 This came only a 
month after the Roof shooting had taken place. Without the attention to race based terrorism acts 
like these would most likely be kept in the local news media but, with the attention brought to 
the issue, the nation had seen what was happening. 
 Another issue that gathered a large amount of public and media attention was gun 
ownership and mental health checks following Roof’s attack. Allegedly, Roof had received his 
firearms purchasers permit due to gaps in the background check process.172 Another major flaw 
cited was the fact that Roof had a drug related arrest in his past.173 This past drug arrest ought to 
have stopped his ability to purchase the firearm he used for the attack.174 The missed arrest 
record was due in part by the system in which the FBI was using for the background checks and 
the major backlog of background checks that are relatively consistently at the door of the FBI.175 
According to law, the FBI has 90 days to complete a background check on a person or, the check 
is pushed through as passed.176 This particular shooting had brought attention to this issue 
because Roof had received his firearm due to this 90 day purge.177 
 The Roof case offered quick investigations and quick apprehension. This case was the 
closest to the ‘by the book’ investigation and arrest. The suspect was quickly identified, tracked 
and peacefully arrested. The issue with this particular case is that, if surveillance tactics were 
 
171  Chandler, Diana. “7 Black Churches Burned in 10 Days.” Baptist Press, 2015.  
172 “Charleston Mass Murderer Got His Gun Because of Background Check Gaps, Internal Report Shows.” Roll 
Call 
173  Ibid. 
174“Charleston Mass Murderer Got His Gun Because of Background Check Gaps, Internal Report Shows.” Roll Call 





used to their fullest extent, Roof’s social media, and writings may have been flagged prior to the 
attack. Though, as stated above, Roof was not supposed to legally have a firearm regardless of a 
prior investigation. Even if full surveillance and tracking was on Roof, the only thing the 
government can do legally would be to flag firearm purchases. They could not necessarily arrest 
him over racist rhetoric and hatred.  
Omar Mateen, Pulse Nightclub Shooting  
 Known Motive 
Omar Mateen made it clear during the police negotiations that he was an agent of the 
Islamic State and that he had targeted the club specifically because “They (US military) are 
killing a lot of innocent people. What am I to do here when my people are getting killed over 
there.”178 Mateen continued, saying this about one of the two Boston Bombers “Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev did his thing on the Boston Marathon ... so now it's my turn, okay?”179 Mateen also 
referred to himself as a “Soldier of the God” who was there in retaliation for the killing of a 
military leader in Syria weeks before the attack at Pulse nightclub.180 No evidence was/is public 
about his training or official affiliation with the so-called Islamic State. Though Mateen’s 
sympathies with the Tsarnaev Brothers points towards a slight affiliation with the extremist 
groups.  
Tactics, Methods, and Targets 
Omar Mateen had entered the Pulse nightclub at 2:00am, he began shooting into the 
crowded club as soon as he walked in.181’182 Mateen was using a .223 semi-automatic rifle and a 
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Glock 9mm, two standard weapons found in every gun shop across America.183 Mateen had 
exchanged gunfire with several police who had been working at the club.184 Mateen had evaded 
those two officers and barricaded himself in a bathroom on the premises.185 During the shooting, 
Mateen had killed 49 people, which at the time was the terror attack with the most casualties in 
modern US history.186 Mateen was killed by police who had broken through his barricade after 
exhausting negotiations.187’188 
What We Learned From The Attack 
A major takeaway from the Orlando shooting was the preparedness of the Orlando law 
enforcement and local government. The training that had taken place was heavily based on 
communication tactics to coordinate the efforts of emergency response.189 This emergency 
response training was primarily done to prepare for hurricanes but has the applicable use of any 
emergency situation.190 Another critical aspect of this case and investigation was the 
communication between the emergency response team and the public.191 The public had gotten 
several updates which were put into the training of the emergency response, this allowed open 
communication with the public and, had fostered a situation after the shooting that allowed 
people to gain a clear picture of what had happened and the scope of the emergency.192 
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This attack had also offered some insight on how political rhetoric can be dangerous after 
such an incident.193 The main stories in the news after Omar Mateen was named as the 
perpetrator, leaned heavily on his ethnic heritage and his travels to the Middle East.194 This kind 
of rhetoric from some of the highest offices in the land and from the news media had set back 
Middle East politics with the US and had placed more prejudice on persons of Middle Eastern 
descent.195 
Where the Mateen attack differs heavily from the other two attacks is that Mateen was 
killed by law enforcement.196 This may have been the only option because Mateen was heavily 
armed and had killed a large number of people by that point but, there are some issues that arise 
from killing the suspect. Mainly, there is the fear of additional threats that could be uncovered if 
the suspect is apprehended. At the time of the shooting there really is no way to know if the 
suspect is acting alone or not until the situation is completely over. In the Mateen case, he was 
acting alone but, suppose he was working with a cell that was planning other attacks for other 
days. If he was apprehended there was potential of stopping future attacks. In this specific case, 
there were no other attackers that were found but there very well could have been.  
The last major takeaway from the Omar Mateen attack was the superb use of social 
media in regards to the emergency response.197 Social media offered a platform for the Orlando 
Police Department to post quick updates without the need of a full  press conference.198 Social 
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media also offered a live update from those who were in the club when the shooting happened.199 
These live updates from people who were in the club had offered useful insight into the shooting 
itself while also allowing loved ones to know they were okay.200 Social media was also the point 
of coordination for the donation of blood after the attack.201 Donation centers were able to post 
the best way for people to help with the recovery of those in need after the shooting.202 
Current Federal Investigatory Policy 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency has created, in 2004, a comprehensive 
document that showcases the protocol surrounding terror incidents.203 The document has the 
purpose of “Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal law 
enforcement and investigative response to a threatened or actual terrorist incident within the 
United States”204 For the investigations, the first priority set forth is the health and wellbeing of 
all those in the surrounding area.205 Next, is preventing the act itself; within this outline, that task 
is given to the FBI who will conduct a “threat credibility assessment”.206 Next is the safety 
control, assessing the situation and determining what needs to be done to ensure the safety of all 
within the threat zone.207 Lastly, the document states that a priority is to “apprehend and 
successfully prosecute perpetrators of terrorist threats or incidents.”208 All of these priorities are 
important to have within an operational guide. These goals are used to ensure the safety of the 
public as well as the investigators. 
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The threat assessment is a tool used by the FBI to determine if a threat is a real one or, if 
it is not likely based on several different criteria. This determines the viability of the threat while 
also categorizing it.209 This threat assessment is based on three main factors, the technical 
feasibility, the operational feasibility and the psychological assessment.210 The technical 
feasibility is an assessment of the threat itself, if a lone-wolf threatens the use of nuclear 
weapons it is a fair to say that the chances of this threat being real are relatively low due to the 
technical capabilities of most lone-wolf terrorists.211 But, in the cases listed above all would be 
within the scope of reality to the investigators if they were notified prior to the incidents. Next is 
the operational feasibility, this is an assessment of the delivery method for the threat.212 
Meaning, how realistic is it that this threat could be done if the threat is real. So, in the cases 
above, perhaps at the time of the McVeigh attack the FBI may have assumed that one person 
would not be able to carry out the attack based on the operational feasibility of that amount of 
explosives and one person carrying out the attack. Lastly is the psychological assessment, this is 
“(an) assessment of the likelihood that the subject(s) will carry out the threat, including a review 
of any written or verbal statement by the subject(s).”213 For all of the subjects above, the 
psychological assessment would show that they had a pattern of threats and statements that 
would show threats being made on those they ended up targeting.  
Overall, from the FEMA threat assessment it is clear that the lone-wolves covered within 
this thesis would be subject to early investigations. This is only the case if they were on law 
enforcement's radar prior to the attack which none publicly were. These investigation tools that 
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are used by law enforcement are helpful to investigations they know that they need to assess. A 
major issue arises when the FBI does not know that an investigation needs to take place.  
Conclusions Drawn from Case Studies 
  The investigations and eventual prosecution of two of the three cases gone through above 
show that the investigation techniques are usable over a wide range of cases. These lone-wolf 
terrorists, Roof, and McVeigh are two examples of lone-actor terrorists but the two cases are 
very far apart in the operational aspect, the technical aspect, and the support they had. In the 
McVeigh case, law enforcement had the opportunity to speak with co-conspirators and could 
have tracked the purchases if the technology was available. In the Roof case, it would have been 
far harder to determine that he was a real threat prior to the attack. There were no unquestionable 
acts that would have pointed law enforcement in the direction that Roof was going. For the 
Mateen case, the prosecution and investigation were cut short due to Mateen being killed in a 
shootout with law enforcement shortly after the attack.214  
 These three cases enhance the discussion surrounding lone-wolf terrorism for many 
reasons. First, these cases were all notable for their time while still being relevant now. Their 
relevance is hinged on how applicable they are to modern lone-wolf terrorist threats. Which all 
three are, shootings and bombings are still a real fear for people in the US. Second, these three 
cases all used different strategies by the perpetrators of the attack as well as the investigators. 
The attackers had each had separate outcomes to their cases. While Mateen was killed while law 
enforcement was attempting to apprehend him, McVeigh was captured inadvertently. Then there 
is the Roof case, which is the only case covered where a successful investigation of the crime 
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ended with a proper arrest. Even with this distinction, the McVeigh arrest was a successful one, 
though, made by chance.  
 What each of these cases offers from a strategic stance is that the investigatory strategies 
that are presently in place may have been a good way to prevent these attacks but show a major 
flaw. They can only be prevented if a threat is reported to the FBI. And even if brought to the  
FBI that does not necessarily mean that they will take the threat seriously. A note, it seems that, 
as stated above, these three cases would have been prevented if the suspect was reported prior to 
the attack but they were not. This flaw could be exploited by any lone-wolf terrorist that can hide 
their communications with whoever radicalized them or can hide their purchases and planning. If 
the type of surveillance and attention was brought to lone-wolf terrorism as is brought to group-
based terrorism, the screening could potentially prevent future attacks.  
The key issues discussed though unsolved, have been brought forth for further 
investigations and discussion. The hope is that soon enough attention will be brought to lone-
wolf terrorism so that the issue can be better addressed. If more surveillance was available there 
is a possibility that more plans would be stopped. Currently, there seems to be a halt on lone-
wolf terrorism that could be attributed to the coronavirus but, there is no reason to believe that in 
a post-Covid world that these kinds of terror attacks will not come back. The reasoning for the 
lack of lone-wolf-style terror attacks in the US during Covid is most likely due to the lack of 
crowds or gatherings that are common targets for these terrorists.  
Conclusion  
In closing, from the investigations covered it is clear that the issue of lone-wolf terrorism 
has an added threat of being harder to detect and prevent. A review of current literature explored 
the concept of four distinctive profiles of lone-wolf terrorists and the process of radicalization. 
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This is applicable information when analyzing modern lone-wolf terrorists, as it aids in the 
facilitation of a deeper understanding of who a lone-wolf terror is, what their motives are and 
how similar attacks could be prevented in the future. Additionally,  it will continue the 
conversation within academia, and attempt to create and spur change within the counter-terror 
tactics employed against lone-wolf terrorists. Categorizing lone-wolf terrorists and studying 
investigational processes of past events allows for a better measure of security in the future. 
Studying lone-wolf terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh, Dylann Roof, and Omar Mateen, can 
lead to valuable insight into the radicalization process, motives, and common similarities 
amongst their profiles. Thus, law enforcement can better survey at-risk individuals and prevent 










































 In an increasingly digital age, the means by which radicalization occurs, the accessibility 
terror organizations have to vulnerable individuals and the methods of tracking utilized by law 
enforcement have transformed. Within this chapter, the digital radicalization process, the most 
effective methods of radicalization, and the law enforcement response to the radicalization 
attempts are explored.  There are several guiding questions, utilized to facilitate the analysis of 
current literature, case studies, and transforming current global digital radicalization trends. The 
following questions will be explored and discussed (1) What are the key points in the 
radicalization process (2) What are the most effective ways for terror groups to radicalize via the 
internet (3) Is this an international issue or, a domestic one (4) How the internet has helped with 
investigations and apprehension after an attack (5) How the internet has helped prevent lone-
wolf terror before it happens? 
The analysis that will be generated based on these structuring research questions will 
formulate a description of vulnerable individuals, how terror organizations are utilizing digital 
methods via the internet and how law enforcement can integrate this data into halting 
radicalization processes globally. These questions will also offer a review of what the most 
effective tactics are, which will allow for more specific targeting of individuals for law 
enforcement networks. Thus, increased attention may be established with regard to radicalization 
in the United States. This radicalization has created unique challenges and has born a new wave 
of homegrown, lone-wolf terrorists. Overall, the internet has had a tremendous impact on lone-
wolf terrorism with regard to prevention and apprehension. However, the progression of modern-





 In Chapter Three there was scrutiny brought to the past of lone-wolf terrorism however, 
within this chapter, ideas surrounding the radicalization and the use of technology in lone-wolf 
terrorism will be explored. This detailed exploration regarding the radicalization of vulnerable 
individuals will analyze the sequential steps of the terror groups’ influence over certain groups 
within The United States. This chapter will start by giving a comprehensive review of current 
literature and outlay a background into the radicalization process in the digital age. Next, an 
exploration of who the terror groups are targeting when attempting to recruit or radicalize will be 
conducted via analysis of case studies, current literature, and digital trends. Further investigating 
the effects of this digital radicalization and how the internet helped grow lone-wolf terrorism, as 
well as what the effects have been for law enforcement will additionally be conducted via review 
and case study analysis. Finally, how the internet is used after a lone-wolf attack and how the 
terror groups and others who are radicalized use the attack as propaganda will be reviewed. 
Overall, establishing a grand strategy perspective, looking into who ought to be taking action 
and, who can take action to prevent lone-wolf terrorism and the radicalization and recruitment of 
these future potential terrorists will be explored. The digital age has fundamentally impacted the 
way that radicalization is initiated, facilitated, and targeted within lone-wolf terrorism. However, 
the progression of modern-day technology has also allowed for exponential growth in 
radicalization.  
Review of Current Literature  
Defining Radicalization  
The internet has been a transformative technological advancement throughout the modern 
era. It has allowed individuals to connect with those around the world, increased accessibility to 
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information, and aided in fostering a deeper understanding of cultures across the globe. 
However, the internet has also introduced a new era in radicalization.215 Often, following a lone-
wolf terror attack, the globe is left asking why this happened and how this individual went 
through the metamorphosis of citizens to terrorists.216 The definition of radicalization has 
changed throughout modern history. Arguments are made to revise the preconceived notions of 
what radicalization is, often associated with questions related to direct correlation between 
radicalization and precursors to extremism.217  However, to truly define radicalization through a 
modern scope, one must assess the distinction between cognitive/attitudinal radicalization, and 
that of behavioral radicalization.218 One definition often associated with radicalization is a 
process that engenders violence and commitment to a singular group.219 In contrast, current 
research suggests that radicalization can be viewed as a predominately cognitive process, which 
may be exacerbated by social media, multimedia and internet influence.220 As such, 
radicalization may be defined as a cognitive and social process of cumulative experiences 
leading to an extremist view of political or religious positions, with the possibility of lending 
way to violence or not.221 Additionally, radicalization is demonstrated via a drastic change in 
one’s opinions, ideologies, and actions.222 Often, these views contrast the liberal democratic 
ideologies associated with constitutional and vast reaching values.223 Overall, the definition of 
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radicalization is contested amongst professionals, however, can be overarchingly categorized by 
changes within one’s cognitive processes, lending to an extremist view of society, religion or 
politics.224  
Radicalization can be subcategorized into two distinctive pyramids, that of opinion and 
action.225 As an individual becomes further radicalized, as in demonstrating more extremist 
points of view and violent actions, the more exclusive the group of similar individuals they are 
associated with becomes smaller.226 When assessing the opinion based pyramid of radicalization, 
one must start with those who hold vastly neutral political or religious opinions, generally inline 
with the greater majority of the public.227 However, when referencing the middle component of 
the opinion radicalization pyramid, these individuals hold sympathetic views of a collective 
cause.228 Furthermore, the apex, and smallest total number of individuals, hold strong beliefs of 
moral and personal obligation toward political or religious causes.229 In contrast, the action 
pyramidal forms of radicalization refers to those individuals who are passive with regard to 
political violence to those who are actively engaged in political violence, terror attack or 
otherwise.230 When assessing radicalization of a particular individual, it is essential to note both 
opinion and action based analyzes to facilitate a deeper understanding of the cognitive profile, 
motivation and effects of their mental state to initiate the radicalization process.  
 The introduction of the digital era, particularly the internet, has led to further contentment 
in the definition of radicalization, the process of which one becomes further radicalized and how 
 
224Kadivar, Jamileh. 2017. “Online Radicalization and Social Media: A Case Study of Daesh.”., 404 
225 Frissen, Thomas. “Internet, the Great Radicalizer? Exploring Relationships between Seeking for Online 
Extremist Materials and Cognitive Radicalization in Young Adults.”., 2 
226 Ibid., 2 
227 Ibid., 2 
228 Ibid., 2 
229 Ibid., 2 
230 Ibid., 2 
 
53 
much the internet influences this process.231 Current literature describes internet or “online” 
radicalization as the process in which individuals seek out extremist materials via the internet to 
learn, foster, and follow radical ideologies, including but not exclusively, violence, to solve a 
moral, religious or political agenda.232 The introduction of the internet has an obvious anecdotal 
connection to increased ease in radicalization efforts.233 Current literature suggests that terror 
groups, at the international level, have embraced the internet as an increasingly accessible form 
of communication, connection, and influence to individuals.234 Many studies have sought to form 
special data on the influence of the internet, digital forms of communication and that of 
radicalization, which will be further explored.235  
Digital Propaganda and Communication  
The internet has allowed for world-wide accessibility and instantaneous connections to 
many individuals. However, with this new technology, terror groups and individuals who are 
seeking to share radicalized ideologies are increasingly able to reach vulnerable individuals by 
harvesting the accessibility provided by the internet. A foremost example of international terror 
groups utilizing online propaganda to radicalize the vulnerable is IS. To initiate and facilitate 
radicalization, IS often utilizes various channels and platforms in a multitude of languages.236   
To target Arabic and non-Arabic audiences alike, IS produces culturally and linguistically 
diverse radicalization materials via the internet, including photos, videos, reports. news , 
magazines, and audio.237 This shift in propaganda tactics is also seen when assessing Al Qaeda, 
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pre and post the 9/11 attacks. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Al Qaeda operated one website, 
primarily in Arabic.238 In contrast, following the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda relied heavily upon 
young adults, establishing a specific media production division, to reach vulnerable individuals 
throughout the western world.239 Thus, Al Qaeda began to develop modern day means of 
radicalization, including audiovisual material.240 
Radicalization Through Social Media and Chat Rooms 
When assessing cognitive radicalization, it is essential to analyze the impact of social 
media. Often, social media, such as Facebook or YouTube, are an impetus for radicalization241 
Social media allows individuals the opportunity to join groups of like-minded individuals and 
participate in conversation, sharing of pictures and videos.242 Studies suggest that this may lead 
to an increased radicalized beliefs.243 Current research suggests that select social media 
interactions have the same impactful influence on an individual's level of radicalization as a face-
to-face communicative exchange.244 The opportunity to communicate directly, by way of various 
chat rooms, messages and videos, with a member of terror or extremist groups allows an 
individual to build deeper connections, internalize the radicalized messages and visualize 
themselves as a member of radicalized groups.245  
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Digital chatrooms, which often allow users to remain anonymous, have also been utilized 
and manipulated by terror groups as a form of communication with individuals across the 
globe.246 The anonymity of being in a chatroom allows for individuals to have an increased 
feeling of security to discuss often forbidden topics.247 Studies suggest that this allows for terror 
groups to foster deeper connections with the individuals within the chatrooms and thus, can 
transition from neutrally forbidden topics to those of a more radicalized nature.248 However, 
social media is not to be viewed as an isolated method or causation of radicalization, as it is 
dependent upon an individual's levels of radicalization, cognitive processes and personal 
beliefs.249 
Current Research on The Digital Radicalization Process 
Thomas Frissen hypothesized that the radicalization process consisted of four steps, 
where an individual gradually and steadily adopts increasingly radical ideologies, resulting from 
an active search of digital materials.250  The four steps explored by Frissen include (1) the 
individual beginning to seek radicalizing information online, (2) initialization of radicalized 
narratives, (3) an increase in delinquency due to moral disengagement and (4) increased 
criminally categorized actions related to terror.251 Additionally, Frissen suggests a correlation 
between juvenile crime and an increased risk of cognitive radicalization.252 Their methodology 
included a questionnaire distributed to secondary schools, including 1,872 individuals, with the 
 
246 Ibid., 1237-1239 
247 Meleagrou-Hitchens,Alexander, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai. 2017. “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment.”., 1237 
248 Ibid., 1237 
249 Kadivar, Jamileh. 2017. “Online Radicalization and Social Media: A Case Study of Daesh.”., 410 
250Frissen, Thomas. “Internet, the Great Radicalizer? Exploring Relationships between Seeking for Online Extremist 
Materials and Cognitive Radicalization in Young Adults.” ., 4 
251 Ibid., 4 
252 Ibid., 4 
 
56 
vast majority within the high school population.253 The survey was given to high school students 
with the goal of gaining information regarding jihadist seeking and cognitive radicalization 
patterns among the general teenage population.254  
Study results showed several jihadist radicalization materials were sought by students to 
varying degrees.255 It was reported that 36.11% of the teenagers within this study have actively 
sought jihadist beheading videos on the internet.256 Additionally, 12% and 14% of teenagers 
surveyed reported seeking out jihadist fora and Facebook groups.257 Although these numbers are 
significant, the radicalization of this sample did not support a high correlation between seeking 
out videos and increasing the level of radicalization. However, in contrast, those who sought 
jihadist magazines, the most exclusive group among those surveyed, demonstrated the highest 
correlation between media and levels of radicalization.258 Frissen suggests an explanation for the 
diverse results in correlation to be the motivation behind seeking various forms of media.259 It is 
suggested that while beheading videos are graphic in nature, they are not of an explicitly 
recruiting nature.260 Meanwhile, jihadist magazines do demonstrate explicit recruitment content 
which aims to foster increased radicalized beliefs in the audience.261 
Given the current research related to the online radicalization process, shifting trends in 
propaganda and increased rate of radicalization material accessibility, the present study will 
explore how these trends impact: (1) analyze patterns and trends throughout the online 
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radicalization process and the profiles of those who are at increased vulnerability (2) terror 
groups are utilizing the internet to radicalize vulnerable individuals internationally and (3) law 
enforcement tactics for tracking potential treats. This exploration will be accomplished via 
analysis of current literature, examination of present radicalization trends, and investigation of 
selected case studies.  
Radicalization and Recruitment in the 21st Century  
 The global transition to a digital age has allowed for greater accessibility and efficiency 
during the radicalization and recruitment process for international terror organizations. 
Organizations, such as The Islamic State, utilize the internet to recruit and spread propaganda 
more than most other terror groups.262 With increased efficiency, terror group recruiters are able 
to identify individuals who are likely to be recruited. Often, relatively young people who are 
seen as outsiders within their community are targeted for radicalization.263 In conjunction with 
targeted recruitment processes, online terrorist propaganda serves as a precondition to believe 
and seek out such material.264 Certain groups of people are more likely to self-radicalize than 
others.265 This self-radicalization is targeted by terror groups because those who are actively 
seeking and researching terror-related material have shown an increased likelihood of acting on 
their radicalized thoughts. 266  
 With the expansion and accessibility of extremist activities on the internet, individuals 
are transitioning to homegrown lone-wolf terrorism with increasingly minimal difficulty.267 This 
is not only due to the ease of access to propaganda and communities of like-minded people, but 
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also a consequence of increased accessibility of weapon schematics, strategies, and tactics.268 
Those vulnerable to radicalization and recruiters utilize a linear set of communication methods. 
They begin with general public forums, then transition to private chat rooms, messaging, and 
video calls. Following this, they advance to encrypted and secure messaging.269 Finally, the 
recruiters will attempt to establish a meeting in person, if necessary.270 Utilizing these types of 
tactics gives the recruiters more anonymity while conducting their radicalization.271  
An important tool in the war chest of the terror networks is identifying two specific 
groups of individuals that they target, who are at increased vulnerability to initiate and maintain 
the radicalization process.272 One targeted group of individuals are those willing to take action 
and fight for the cause, taking up arms and plans for their moment.273 This individual is the target 
of extreme radicalization and poses a real and active threat to the community to which they 
live.274 Though the people who fall under this distinction, though the ultimate goal of the terror 
organization, it is not necessarily their most effective use of time. Radicalization of these 
targeted individuals takes time and effort whereas, the other type of targeting helps the cause in a 
profound way and takes very little effort and reliably little time. In contrast, the other primarily 
targeted group of individuals are those who sympathize with and will tote the lines of the 
organization but are unlikely to act on their ideology in a violent way.275 These converts do 
interact with the organization directly online but, where the violent radicalized individuals may 
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act on their ideology, these converts will spread the messages and recruit people into the 
organization.276 
The use of digital tools does not just focus on the active recruitment of individuals 
vulnerable to radical thoughts but also serves as terror organizations’ outward propaganda. This 
can especially be seen with al-Qaeda, where the digital footprint leaves a major impression. Al-
Qaeda uses its digital platform to glorify and spread the word of their leaders, their philosophy, 
and grand strategy.277 However, their digital propaganda does not end there. Al-Quadea uses 
those they refer to as martyrs to publicize the risks and operations they had committed around the 
world.278 This kind of propaganda provides al-Qaeda the ability to control the narrative shown to 
those who sympathize with their cause, further radicalizing those people.  
 Al-Qaeda's digital resources also introduce potential recruits with resources involving 
targeting, weaponry and security.279 The weaponry aspect is highlighted within the al-Qaeda‘s 
article, “how to build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom”. This article presumably targets those 
vulnerable to radicalization who still live with their parents.280 This kind of publication can be 
taken down if found on major platforms but, it is still possible for would-be terrorists to find it 
and manuals like it. This was the article that inspired the Tsarnaev brothers to commit the Boston 
bombing in 2013.281 The security aspect of al-Qaeda's digital outreach to potential recruits 
focuses on “computer security, and instructions about hacking into computer network”282 This 
information can be used by lone-wolves especially because, if they have communication with 
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terror networks, the only likely way they will be apprehended prior to their attack is by 
intercepting the communications between them and their recruiter/trainer.  
 Lastly, al-Qaeda utilizes their digital outreach network to insight violence and 
targeting.283 This is the next step after the recruitment process, once they know someone is 
sympathetic or an active supporter, they want to get that person to act on their sympathies. Al-
Qaeda will provoke people to commit “violent jihad” and will provoke revolts around certain 
symbolic days or events, depending on the target country or ethnicity.284 To continue, another 
powerful weapon they have in spreading terrorism and, anti-wester sentiment is through “urging 
people to support jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates and al-Shabaab in Somalia”.285  
This outreach shows that al-Qaeda understands their limitations with rhetoric, regions, 
sympathies and would rather push someone to consider other terror networks than not support 
one at all.  
History and Current Climate 
In an increasingly digital age, the internet has served as a catalyst for the recruitment, 
development, and eventual execution of lone-wolf terrorism. This is demonstrated when 
exploring the formulation and radicalization of Junaid Hussain.286 Junaid created the platform in 
which IS has been operating their internet-based attacks.287 As discussed within the Hacker 
Down documentary, the only key needed to access this side of terrorism is a computer and a 
willingness to operate against a target unlawfully.288 Hussain was operating for the terror group 
IS but he could have been taking up a fight for any reason; he could have chosen any path of 
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destruction. Just because he had chosen to hack and do internet-based attacks does not exclude 
him from being considered as a lone-wolf terrorist. He had started as a teenager hacking into 
websites and the personal accounts of other people. As this anti-establishment inclinations led to 
him joining a group that also fought against authority within the UK.289  
As the internet becomes increasingly accessible on a global scale, concerns related to 
scope, tracking, effect and security have become apparent. These concerns are not answered 
within the documentary nor in most other sources because this threat is changing far faster than 
traditional warfare. 290 As discussed in the documentary, Hacker Down: The Life and Death of 
an ISIS Social Media Star, hacking is a unique threat because those involved can often remain 
anonymous and frequently act alone.291 Internet hackers, and those with significant knowledge of 
internet-based attacks, are prime targets for recruiters due to their value to the terror 
organization. An individual who possesses these qualities and who becomes radicalized requires 
minimal equipment and time to facilitate notable impacts within a given target.292 As stated by 
Vida Vilić, a terror group may benefit from conducting internet-based attacks: 
“The most common and obvious reasons why the terrorists rely on cyberspace are 
because it is significantly cheaper, completely anonymous, the variety and number of 
targets and potential victims are enormous and just "a click away" – there is no need to 
cross any distance or to be seen as a perpetrator. By using the Internet, because of its 
availability and distribution, it is easier to recruit and mobilize new supporters of terrorist 
ideas, to find information and facilities regardless of the part of the globe where they are 
physically located, it is easier to find sources of financing, to build connections for the 
implementation of joint actions, to exchange information and to educate new members 
for illegal activities.”293 
This supports the notion that lone-wolf terrorism has the potential to generate great 
impacts and influence others. There are three primary categorizations within cyber terrorism: 
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Simple unstructured, Advanced Structured, and Complex Coordinated.294 Simple and 
unstructured attacks involve lone actors committing crimes that constitute terrorism labeling 
which may include small hacking groups, similar to Hussain in his early career.295’296 In 
comparison, Advanced and Structured cyber terrorism will benefit from terror group financial 
and strategic support. 297 Lastly, Coordinated, and Complex cyber terrorism is primarily done by 
state-sponsored hacking groups who target large entities that would usually take a lot of time, 
effort, and manpower to overwhelm.298 
Communication and Propaganda 
 The radicalization process takes the form of recruiters reaching out, and forming a 
connection with an individual they have deemed to be susceptible to radicalization.299 This 
susceptibility is usually based on identifying with the suffering that a potential recruit has 
experienced.300 Those who can become radicalized will follow an ideology and eventually, be 
brought into a group of like-minded individuals who may radicalize them. As was said in a 
Congressional hearing from the 111th Congress  
“ (...) there is this common perception that people get interested in something, and then 
they get radicalized, and then they get recruited by an organization. And from my 
research and my experiences doing research in the Middle East, I think we can say it is a 
little bit backwards from that. People get interested in something, then are recruited by an 
organization who then radicalizes them.”301  
This showcases the progression of those who seek out the terror networks that end up turning 
radical sentiment to radical ideology that can consume a person’s way of thinking. 
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Propaganda stands to be the most powerful weapon in the major terror networks war 
chest. The use of propaganda serves to recruit those who are willing to take action while also 
further pushing the sympathies of those who identify with their messaging. This messages have 
been proven to be very valuable to groups like al-Qaeda who determined their digital outreach 
and recruitment to be “a great medium for spreading the call of Jihad and following the news of 
the mujahideen (Islamic warriors)”302 This designation was proclaimed by al-Awlaki, a high-
ranking member of al-Qaeda at the time who was also the major inspiration to several lone-wolf 
terrorists such as Dr.  Nidal Malik Hasan and Private Naser Jason Abdo.303 Terrorists such as 
these two prove that al-Qaeda’s digital outreach does have an impact on homegrown, lone-wolf 
terrorism in the US. The communication networks that terror groups can provide those who 
sympathize with their messaging can allow someone to receive operational manuals and news 
from inside the networks that can feed into the narrative and help grow the anti-western 
sentiment that creates terrorists.304’305   
 One of the most effective ways in which established terror groups can use the internet for 
radicalization purposes is through the use of so-called training camps.306 These training camps 
are completely online and include instruction manuals and videos relating to targeting of attacks, 
technology and weaponry, and the use of media.307 Al-Qaeda’s online training camp is called Al-
Battar and focuses mostly on how terror cells or radicalized individuals can carry out attacks and 
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post all of the video online for further radicalization purposes.308 Propaganda like what is found 
from al-Qaeda cells is a driving force within the digital radicalization realm.  
 The propaganda does not end with overly violent and graphic content but, an important 
tool used by Hamas and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia to attract and radicalize 
children. The two groups use games and cartoons to attract children to their organization.309 
These games and cartoons are not just fun programs that offer a flavor of radical ideology but, 
teach the children watching how to carry out acts of terror, assassinations and how to become 
suicide bombers.310 Though these details do not directly relate to lone-wolf terrorism, it paints a 
picture of how far many terror cells are willing to go for the opportunity to have a future fighter. 
The radicalization techniques and procedures are tools the terror cells use and who they impact 
and how they impact matters far less than it affects people. If someone is repulsed by the media 
they see such as these children's programs, they may go and seek other media to continue their 
hate. This gives the terror organization more exposure and, the more someone seeks out media 
and propaganda the more likely they are to become radicalized.  
Radicalization of Historical Lone-Wolf Terrorists 
Dylann Roof 
As previously established through a thorough case-study review in Chapter Three, Roof 
was labeled by expert witnesses as a ‘self-radicalized’ individual who had fully engrossed 
himself in the white supremacy movement.311 His radicalization can be attributed to literature 
and propaganda he had looked for on his own and, not a leadership based radicalization path as 
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was seen in several previous case studies covered in Chapter Two.312 Even Roof’s travel records 
were found to be consistent with someone who is on the path of radicalization, with an expert 
witness stating that his travel showed that he had visited numerous amounts of Confederate 
related locations.313 All of these details, paired with the lack of leadership within the process 
shows that Roof was in fact a self-radicalized lone-wolf terrorist.   
Timothy McVeigh  
Shortly after McVeigh’s departure from the US military, he had been plagued with 
extreme anxiety which manifested in anti-government sentiments.314 These antigovernment 
feelings quickly turned into print media where McVeigh had article he had written be published 
in local newspapers.315 These articles detailed the perceived decline of the US paired with fear 
mongering about the government taking weapons away from citizens.316 Two major events 
during his radicalization had pushed his rhetoric and thoughts further, first was the shootout 
involving Randy Weaver and, second was the 1993 events at Waco.317 These two events had 
involved firearms and federal agents attempting to take fire arms, both topics McVeigh was 
primed to latch on to. McVeigh’s radicalization process follows a path without a leader, as he 
had been largely self-radicalized. McVeigh had pushed his thoughts and anxiety to the limit and 
acted on those thoughts in an attempt to hinder the federal government’s ability to sufficiently 





314 Rajakumar, Vikram. "Alternative Perspectives on the Radicalization of Home-grown and “Leaderless” 
Terrorists." Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5, no. 8 (2013): 20-22. 
315 Ibid., 21 
316  Ibid., 21 
317  Ibid., 21 
 
66 
Omar Mateen was found to be radicalized online, according to the FBI.318 Mateen’s 
radicalization path follows a worrying trend among many who become radicalized, they are in a 
vulnerable place and, at the right moment they end up sympathizing with international terror 
movements or, domestic violent groups. This case is relatively similar to the case of Dylann 
Roof due to the fact that neither necessarily had a leader who was training, directing or planning 
with them but, were mesmerized by the literature and propaganda they found online. Mateen had 
produced clear evidence that showed his inspiration by international terror organizations and, his 
hatred for the homosexual community so, there was a combination of hatred and terror based 
motivations.319 
The Internet and the Growth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism  
 One of the  biggest contributing factors to the use of the success of terror organization 
outreach online is anonymity.320 This anonymity offers would-be terrorists the ability to explore 
the thoughts and feelings they have without the threat of being exposed as a sympathizer or a bad 
actor. The anonymity, as was covered previously, helps the terror cells reach a wide audience 
whereas, in the past, those who sympathize would have to either make a conservative effort to 
travel to a known region for terror activity or, seek out a local extremist. Both prospects are 
rather unlikely because for someone to take those extreme steps they would have already been 
radicalized. All of this is next to the internet where a sympathizer can be in a chat room with 
others who sympathize and those who are active members of the organization. The internet 
offers a middle ground between thoughts and action.  
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 The other major contributing factor for the internet being such an effective tool for terror 
organization’s outreach and radicalization is the wide net they can cast for future potential 
converts.321 This outreach is likely the most influential part of the use of the internet by these 
terror organizations. This is due to the major difference between non-internet recruitment and 
internet base recruitment scaling. As was said by Martin Bouchard, in reference to terror 
networks' use of social media: “This allows these groups to promote awareness of their cause and  
to  convey  their  message  to,  and  perhaps  foster  sympathy  from,  an  international 
audience”.322 The scale of the media and propaganda on the internet can reach almost everyone 
in the world meaning, there will presumably be an increase in recruitment.  
Weapons, Tactics, and Resources  
 A major role online resources provided by terror networks plays is publishing weapon 
development and implementation tactics. These guides are circulated and saved by those who 
sympathize with the terror networks’ cause and can be distributed to those who have expressed 
interest in taking action as well as those who the network is attempting to radicalize.323 The use 
of these guides in the radicalization process can be used to showcase how others have made 
martyrs of themselves using the same strategies and technology.324 These weapon guides have 
played an important role in the violent acts of lone-wolf terrorists in the modern era.325  
International and Domestic Radicalization  
The process of radicalization transcends throughout the world, regardless of race, 
orientation, or origin. The introduction of the internet has allowed for recruiters from across the 
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globe to interact with at-risk individuals to discuss radicalized thoughts and actions. Without the 
internet, the radicalization process would be far more involved and demand the dedication of 
those who were becoming radicalized. Without internet access or invention, these individuals 
would have to seek out like-minded persons in their community or, travel to regions with known 
sympathizers. Both of these actions would open up a vulnerable person who was seeking them 
out to the liability of being caught far easier due to the face-to-face nature of these meetings. 
Tracking and reporting of a suspect would have been far easier due to in-person meetings and 
more open communications. In comparison, the modern radicalization landscape allows 
communications can be hidden and deep under layers of encryption and hidden networks. The 
modern radicalization landscape allows those who are seeking radicalization-related literature, 
training, and propaganda to have access to all they need with a few strokes of the keyboard rather 
than international travel and face-to-face meetings.  
 The changing landscape of the radicalization process has created blurred lines 
regarding the distinction between domestic terror and international terror due to the ease and 
simplicity of access to terror related resources online. The FBI has a clear distinction between 
domestic and international terrorism which is as follows: “International terrorism: Violent, 
criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, 
designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).”326 vs. “Domestic 
terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological 
goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or 
environmental nature.”327 These differences, though distinct, leave perpetrators such as Omar 
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Mateen and Timothy McVeigh out of both categories while also being in both categories. This is 
due to the blurred lines in a complex modern world where domestic and international issues tend 
to, in many cases, be one in the same.   
International Implications 
As Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations said: “The Internet is a 
prime example of how terrorists can behave in a truly transnational way; in response, States need 
to think and function in an equally transnational manner.”328 This encapsulates the true 
international nature of radicalization and the recruitment process. Even if there is a lone-wolf 
terrorist in a small town in the US, that does not mean that it is necessarily an isolated 
occurrence. Recruitment and radicalization online can cross borders and cross platforms. Terror 
networks using the internet in radicalization and recruitment is an international issue that needs 
leadership. This leadership could be found in the US if action is taken to unify other nations 
behind the cause.  
 So, it has been established that this is in fact an international issue, one that goes further 
than just lone-wolf terrorism, though it plays an integral role in the target audience for the digital 
outreach of terror organizations. The question must be asked, what are countries doing about the 
issue? Nations such as the US have recognized that an issue exists, “ U.S. documents emphasize 
international cyber cooperation (interoperability, intelligence sharing, training) with [like-minded 
countries, industry, academia and civil society]”.329 This does show that the US is willing to 
work with other nations on intelligence gathering operations as well as general cooperation on 
the digital front.330 
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Internet Impact on Law Enforcement 
 With current surveillance techniques being increasingly complex, encrypted and intricate, 
it has become essential for intelligence agencies to sequentially analyze the data and make a 
connection to terrorists easily. One such tool that is being utilized to analyze connections within 
terrorist networks and radicalization via the internet meta-data. Meta-data is stored data by 
intelligence agencies to determine, track and survey who a specific, targeted individual is 
contacting, how they are contacting them and how frequently they are contacting them.331 This 
strategy of collecting, storing and analyzing meta-data can be expanded to include internet search 
history for key words, shopping history and location data.332 All of this data can be tracked and 
analyzed by intelligence agencies to identify terror sympathizers, identify potential 
communications and explore their activities throughout the radicalization process. 
 Tele-communication and social media entities provide personal, targeted digital data 
which allow the National Security Agency the opportunity to identify, analyze and determine 
potential connections from individuals and a larger terror cell.333 Though this sounds invasive, it 
is the same strategy the tele-communication and tech companies do to consumers every day.334 
These companies produce cross platform profiles on a consumer to determine who they are for 
targeted advertisements. Similarly, the intelligence community is able to generate profiles on 
people to determine what their threat level is and, if further surveillance is necessary to prevent 
further radicalization.335 The metadata can be used to create profiles on potential future terrorists 
who happen to begin actively seeking for propaganda, communication networks or media 
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provided by terror networks. All of this data can be collected and connections can be made prior 
to the terrorist ‘going dark’ by using a series of protected servers and VPN scrambling.  
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, it has been established that there is a connection between the introduction 
of the internet and an increasing number of radicalized individuals. This connection relates 
directly to the issue of lone-wolf terrorists due to the fact that many of those who have become 
radicalized can and will act alone. The internet has allowed for increased accessibility, however, 
terror groups have transitioned radicalization to primarily a digital form. Thus, radicalization has 
become quicker and increasingly streamlined. Terror groups often identify vulnerable 
individuals, who are initially seeking terror propaganda independently, to further radicalize via 
various online platforms, including chat rooms, social media, and visual audio formats.  
There are several key aspects of the radicalization process, from general propaganda to 
instruction manuals, these tools are used to create the sympathizers and terrorists of the future. 
One of the most important takeaways is the terror networks' use of digital media in the 
radicalization process. It has been proven that different forms of digital media offer vulnerable 
people the resources to continue their path to radical thought. Next, is the terror networks’ use of 
online chat rooms, this is an important step in the radicalization process due to the fact that the 
recruiter on the other side can play into a vulnerable individual’s concerns and sympathies.  
Terror groups utilize a multitude of diverse media to increase the radicalization of 
targeted individuals. Terror groups often utilize digital propaganda in diverse languages to 
maximize their potential audiences. Digital propaganda includes, but is not limited to videos, 
magazines, speeches, radio, and television. Furthermore, the internet allows terror groups to 
infiltrate chatrooms and social media groups to connect with individuals vulnerable to greater 
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radicalization. Within these chat groups, terror organizations are able to establish connections 
with vulnerable individuals, who are more likely to ask questions and openly communicate due 
to the anonymous nature of these groups. This allows for greater efficiency in the radicalization 
process and for terror groups to reach individuals in the western world, who were inaccessible 
prior to the introduction of the internet.   
Although the internet has allowed terror groups to identify those vulnerable to 
radicalization, it has also aided law enforcement to do the same. Law enforcement is able to 
utilize meta-data to identify these individuals based on their online activity. By establishing 
patterns in online activity, typical keyword searches, or communication with specific networks, 
law enforcement is better able to stop the radicalization process prior to the individual engaging 
in violent acts. This has the potential to aid law enforcement in decreasing the amount of 
radicalization on the internet, thus, decreasing the amount of lone-wolf radicalization-based 
activities within the United States.  
Terror networks use the internet to spread their messaging as well as recruit vulnerable 
people in their network proves that this cannot be treated as a domestic issue. These recruiters 
can be reaching out to people from across the world and create radical thoughts. With the 
internet revolution came a revolution of the way in which the international community must deal 
with terror networks and their outreach. A network can spread propaganda, hate, massaging, and 
resources around the world without leaving their computer. This issue clearly transcends borders 
and affects the biggest cities to the smallest communities. From the wealthiest countries to the 
most poverty-stricken, anywhere that someone has internet access, they have access to a global 
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This thesis finds that lone-wolf terrorism is rapidly transforming. This means that, law 
enforcement agencies must adapt to the ever-changing nature of radicalization, recruitment, and 
motivations. As demonstrated through case study analysis, review of current literature, and 
exploration of transforming trends, the internet has served as a catalyst for the evolving profile of 
a lone-wolf terrorist as well as those at risk for increased radicalization. However, the internet 
has also allowed the opportunity for law enforcement agencies to facilitate strict protocol to 
decrease the rate of radicalization, research the profiles of past lone-wolf terrorists and develop 
methods to intervene in the radicalization process.  
In Chapter II,  surrounding lone-wolf terrorism are assessed. This chapter utilized 
existing definitions and analysis to challenge many people’s preconceived notion of what a lone-
terrorist is and who they are. This analysis produced a definition of a lone-wolf terrorist while 
also paving a path away from the traditional definition. Also established within this chapter is the 
thought that lone-wolf terrorism is a tool in the large terror organization’s tool belt. Meaning that 
the lone-wolf terrorist is one of the most effective ways in which a terror organization can have 
an operative go untracked and unnoticed in many cases. Creating a profile of a lone-wolf terrorist 
is one of the first steps in combating this growing threat. Through the use of past events and 
terror analysis, this chapter established an understanding of a modern lone-wolf terrorist profile.  
Loner’s, Colleagues, or Peers? Assessing the Social Organization of Radicalization, 
offered three distinct cognitive and behavioral profiles for lone-wolf terrorists. First, a lone-wolf 
terrorist can be categorized as a “loner”.336 These individuals seek out radicalized materials 
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independent of outside influence, are self-organized, and act independently of co-conspirators. 
Next, radicalized individuals can be subcategorized as “colleagues”.337 Individuals with this 
categorization often work with others during the radicalization process, engaging in conversation 
with like-minded individuals, to devise plans and share radicalized thoughts. Furthermore, these 
individuals are often lacking executive functioning organizational skills, but demonstrate great 
strength in structuring knowledge and sequential events. Finally, the last type of lone-wolf 
terrorist are those who identify as an active member within a terror organization, but choose to 
work alone. These individuals are classified as “peers”.338 These are all examples of lone-wolf 
terrorists, but have distinctive personality, radicalization and cognitive traits associated with 
them. Thus, delving deeper within the profiles of lone-wolf terrorists can help identify these 
individuals early within the radicalization process, to hinder their efforts to further radicalize.  
In Chapter II, further exploration of what a lone-wolf terrorist is and how the lone-wolf 
terrorist operates is done. These concepts are investigated through the use of case studies, a lens 
of law enforcement analysis, and the investigatory/apprehension procedures used. This chapter 
utilized modern case studies and current literature of what are usually considered the most 
famous example of lone-wolf terrorism, in the modern age. Though the three cases covered are 
rather different, the similarities they have support and showcase the issues within the 
investigations and screening of lone-wolf terrorists.  
The first case study analyzed was that regarding Timothy McVeigh of the Oklahoma City 
Bombing. While McVeigh did engage with several co-conspirators during the radicalization 
process, ultimately he acted alone during the violent attack. This is classified as a colleague lone-
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wolf terror attack. During the radicalization process, McVeigh expressed radicalized thoughts 
regarding the anti-federal government. The government utilized profiling tactics to determine 
that McVeigh was their suspect following their attack, including identifying his occupation, race, 
gender, age, and personality type. This profile, in conjunction with witness testimony, led to their 
narrowed search for McVeigh. The investigation and subsequent arrest of McVeigh led to 
transformative changes within the FBI and government investigatory tactics. This included more 
efficient investigative practices, interviews, and the collection of evidence-based on the 
terroristic profile created.  
The second case study analyzed was Dylann Roof of the Charleston Church Shooting. 
Roof experienced radicalization of political thoughts toward a particular race of people. Due to 
his radicalization process, whereas he acted alone and self-radicalized by way of the internet, 
Dylann Roof can be classified as a ‘loner’ lone-wolf terrorist. An impact garnered from Dylann 
Roof’s attack was the profile of mental health for lone-wolf terrorists. His profile led to law 
enforcement and professionals being given the opportunity to analyze the mental health of at-risk 
individuals, study his path to radicalization, and develop programs with specific background 
checks for at-risk individuals.  
The last case study analyzed was that of Omar Mateen, of the Pulse Nightclub Shooting. 
Omar Mateen was an example of a ‘peer’ lone-wolf terrorist as he self-identified as a member of 
the Islamic State, however, he acted alone in his violence. This was an act derived from political 
and religious extremism. This case had been a particularly interesting one because there was no 
additional information that was available from Mateen after the incident due to his death in the 
police shootout. The Mateen case and its conclusions largely were based upon literature that was 
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found in his belongings, travel logs, information found on his computer, and his online search 
history.  
Chapter IV delves into the most modern issue regarding lone-wolf terrorism, the internet. 
It was established in chapter IV that the internet is one of the strongest tools terror organizations, 
and lone-wolves, have at their disposal. Through the use of the internet, terror organizations can 
reach a wide audience of potential supporters and sympathizers. This wide audience is reached 
through the use of several different avenues of online propaganda, chatrooms, and social media 
sites. The most common form of radicalization propaganda are videos of fighting and general 
violence to individualized chat rooms that feed into a vulnerable person’s gripes with society or 
how their life is going.  
 To follow that, the resources that are made available to lone-wolf terrorists through the 
internet have made far more advances, better trained, and more effective terrorists. Resources 
that are being provided by groups, such as al-Qaeda, have changed the landscape of how 
sympathizers are tracked and how deadly the outcomes of terror incidents are. These resources 
range from how to conceal online activity to how to build an effective bomb. These tactics 
circulated by al-Qaeda have changed how law enforcement and the intelligence community can 
cope with the growing issue of home-grown, lone-wolf terrorism. 
The process of radicalization can take several forms but, the most common approach to 
the issue is that someone who sympathizes with an organization’s cause will be in contact with 
someone who takes simple sympathies and builds upon them to create a situation that ends with 
full radicalization. Radicalization is defined within this paper as the process in which an 
individual takes steps from a mere sympathizer to the next step to someone who is willing to take 
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action on their sympathies. A radicalized person has a paradigm shift to ensure that all of their 
world views do not contradict the narrative they have been fed.  
The radicalization process is not sequential, rather, it is a progression of radicalized 
thoughts, which lead to actions of violence, extreme political or religious beliefs. This process 
begins with an individual's interest in a particular sect of a religious or political movement. The 
individual's involvement in this sect can sometimes lead them to a smaller set of people within 
that larger group who can pivot to more violent rhetoric or action. These small groups are usually 
where vulnerable individuals are radicalized. These small groups could be physical groups of 
people or found online. When online, these smaller groups are likely to be in chat rooms where 
identities can be hidden and the echo chamber can be loud. Once pulled into the narrative, many 
of these vulnerable people will continue down the path of radicalization until they are recruiting 
others or are violent.  
Recommendations Based on Findings 
Identification of At-Risk Individuals  
As outlined, there are three various profiles demonstrated amongst historic lone-wolf 
terrorists. These profiles, designated as “loner”, “colleagues” and “peers”, are varied in nature 
and can be identified early within the radicalization process. “Loners” seek out radicalized 
materials independently, are well organized, and act alone.  It is recommended that law 
enforcement agencies monitor the online activity of individuals to identify those who are 
independently seeking out propaganda material. “Colleagues” often work with others throughout 
the radicalization process, they are likely less organized than “loners” and seek out like-minded 
individuals. It is recommended that law enforcement agencies engage with these individuals 
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online to halt the radicalization process, as they are likely to seek others online. Due to the 
impacted nature of executive functioning skills within the “colleagues” profile, if law 
enforcement engages with these individuals prior to them initiating the tasks associated with 
complete radicalized thoughts, it is likely to decrease or halt the radicalization process. Lastly, 
individuals with profiles consistent with “peers” actively engage with terror groups via the 
internet, identify as a member of these groups, and facilitate violence in the name of these groups 
individually. When attempting to identify and apprehend these individuals, law enforcement 
agencies should monitor the activity within terror group online networks, identifying individuals 
who frequent these groups and engage with them via the internet.  
Patterns are also demonstrated with regard to method of radicalization, and connection to 
terror groups. First, the connection to outside terror groups was a very common theme, more 
specifically, connections to al-Qaeda and Anwar al-Awlaki. These connections are not a 
coincidence, al-Qaeda expands large amounts of resources to online recruitment. Other 
connections that were seen throughout the case studies were weapons of choice. The weapons 
that were used were either firearms or bombs, the intriguing point about that is the fact that no 
other chemical or radioactive weapons were utilized by the cover persons. Using weapons such 
as chemical and radioactive, though not unseen, is very uncommon. Weapons of mass 
destruction like these ought to be a top priority for law enforcement due to their effectiveness 
and the lasting effects on the area. It is not inconceivable that a lone-wolf could, in theory, use 
WMDs such as those mentioned in an attack.  
Following a lone-wolf terror attack, a profile of the individual should be generated and 
secured private from the general public. As seen within the analyzed case studies, there are 
several trends within the cognitive, behavioral and motivational profiles of lone-wolf terrorists. 
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Following an attack, it is essential for law enforcement to generate a private profile of the lone-
wolf terrorist independent of media influence or impact. This is due in part to the educational 
process of profiling lone-wolf terrorists. Law enforcement gaining data on lone-wolf terrorist 
digital and radicalization trends is essential in prevention of future lone-wolf terrorist attacks. 
Analyzing the cognitive, behavioral and motivational profiles of known lone-wolf terrorist, and 
comparing them to those of historic terrorists will allow for a greater understanding and 
development of what an at-risk individual appears to be physically, mentally and digitally. This 
will allow law enforcement the opportunity to identify individuals early within the radicalization 
process, engage in deradicalizing conversations or methods and halt radicalization prior to 
violent actions. It is essential for these profiles to remain independent of media influence or 
impact as terror organizations can utilize them much like law enforcement, to identify 
individuals more likely to generate radicalized thoughts.  
Monitoring of Online Chatrooms 
As previously mentioned, chatroom and social media groups serve as a primary means of 
communication between recruiters and those at risk for further radicalization. Due to the 
anonymous nature these groups provide, being individuals can remain anonymous via fake 
identities, it has been shown that chatroom and social media groups are sought by those 
beginning to become increasingly radicalized. Often, individuals who are beginning to have 
increasingly radicalized thoughts seek chatrooms and social media groups to communicate with 
like-minded individuals, ask questions that are less likely to be asked in a non-anonymous 
setting. This can lead to furthering radicalized thoughts, and potentially dangerous or violent 
actions, and the development of a lone-wolf terrorist.  
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 To combat the rising number of radicalized individuals via social media and chat rooms, 
law enforcement can also take advantage of the anonymous nature allotted in these 
environments. Based on the research conducted on the radicalization process, when individuals 
are beginning to seek out like-minded individuals and joining social media groups, it is a very 
influential period in the radicalization process. To capitalize upon this influential period, law 
enforcement agencies should implement specific and specialized task forces to infiltrate these 
groups, engage with these individuals and begin an attempt to slowly halt the furthering of 
radicalized thinking. When engaging with at-risk individuals, law enforcement agencies should 
not approach the conversation with overt signs of deradicalizing intentions. Rather, just as is 
done within terror groups attempting to recruit, law enforcement officers should first engage in 
conversation with at-risk individuals, build a trusting rapport and slowly transition the 
conversation to that of a deradicalizing nature. Implementing specific task forces to engage with 
individuals in chat rooms and via social media will allow law enforcement to have direct 
communication with those frequenting these groups, seeking out propaganda, and engaging in 
radicalized discussions. This will give the opportunity for law enforcement to intervene early 
within the radicalization process, halting radicalized thoughts and potentially decreasing the 
likelihood of violent actions.  
 Tracking Internet Activity via Meta-Data 
Utilizing the meta-data to track the digital propaganda people are searching for is likely 
the best way to track the radicalization process before the individual conceals their online 
history. This method would require intelligence agencies to create databases tracking keywords 
and search terms. This database would connect the propaganda that is most likely to radicalize a 
vulnerable individual and the IP addresses that are looking them up. Through the use of the IP 
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address, the search history along with communications can be tracked to identify that individual's 
likelihood of radicalization. If the person is of a high likelihood of radicalization, local police 
and the ATF would be notified and an investigation would take place. Pending the investigation, 
tracking online activity, and communication logs would be collected until the full investigation is 
completed.  
The most effective approach to apprehending recruiters, identifying those participating in 
radicalized conversation, and those seeking online propaganda methods used by terror 
organizations are utilizing meta-data to create webs of communication between known terrorists 
and vulnerable people. To bring the fight directly to the organizers of the digital radicalization 
front, law enforcement ought to use the meta-data collected to identify kingpin recruiters to 
target for further monitoring. This intelligence-gathering operation would ideally widen the 
scope of monitoring to all connected to the known recruiters. Furthermore, one of the most 
impactful changes would be data sharing with other intelligence agencies from allied nations. 
Sharing data on known recruiters, and co-conspirators will allow for more arrests and monitoring 
to take place without the fear of violating international law.  
Realistic Implementation of Recommendations 
The concept of lone-wolf terrorism and radicalization is not uniquely modern in nature 
but has transformed throughout modern-day eras. The introduction of the internet has served as a 
catalyst for an increasing rate and accessibility to radicalization and radicalized materials. Thus, 
it is essential that law enforcement adapts to the current trends to better prevent future attacks. 
Although the process of meta-data, monitoring online chat rooms, and identifying individuals at 
greater risk of radicalization is time-consuming and all-encompassing in nature, if the necessary 
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funds are allocated to this process, it may help prevent further radicalization of vulnerable 
individuals, decreasing the likelihood of future violent attacks and protecting the general public.  
Though all that was recommended would greatly help the counterintelligence operation 
against terror organizations, it is not without its faults. First, and foremost, there are major 
constitutional concerts when considering tracking and monitoring in this way. These concerns 
are directly related to the warrantless searches that would be conducted throughout the program. 
Though, as was covered earlier, there are existing programs that have very similar functions. 
These programs have been working to collect and sift through the meta-data of every individual 
in the US and, with several additions to the layers of sorting, this program could very well be 
adjusted to serve the needs of this national security concern.  
 In conclusion, in an increasingly digital age, the internet has been the catalyst of 
increased radicalization on the international level, leading to an increased number of radicalized 
individuals, violent acts, and future potential threats. The internet has allowed terror groups to 
build connections with individuals around the globe, share their radicalized thoughts, and 
increase the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. They have utilized diverse media to target 
individuals with the potential to become further radicalized, benefiting from the anonymity of 
online chat rooms, to build connections, openness to scaffolding upon minimal radicalized 
thoughts, and establish the predecessors to violent and overtly radicalized actions. However, the 
internet has allotted the opportunity for law enforcement to track, explore and determine targeted 
individuals to halt radicalization prior to total radicalization. Overall, the internet has impacted 
the radicalization process from both the perspective of terror groups and law enforcement 
internationally, and thus, has the potential to be an essential tool in elevating the amount of 
radicalized lone-wolf terrorists. This has allowed for the identification of similarities amongst 
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lone-wolf profiles, leading to the generation of several cognitive and behavioral profiles. Further 
surveillance, monitoring, and apprehension from law enforcement, given these profiles, will 
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